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PROPERTY LAW’S SEARCH FOR A PUBLIC 
NADAV SHOKED* 
ABSTRACT 
Public spaces—streets, sidewalks, parks, plazas, squares, and the like—
form a major component of the physical environment. Therefore, disputes 
over the use and management of these spaces abound. Courts analyze each 
such dispute individually through the prism of the discrete property law 
doctrine that appears applicable. The result is a hodgepodge of inconsistent 
rulings that too often ignore the common normative principles implicated 
in all debates over public spaces. This Article advances a general 
framework for the legal treatment of public spaces. It argues that, at heart, 
every dispute over the use of a public space requires the law to answer one 
fundamental question: Who, in the case at hand, should be deemed the 
“public” actually holding the implicated public right? After all, the 
“public” is not a recognized legal entity. The law identifies disparate bodies 
that might stand for the “public” in a specific case—and accordingly be 
empowered to dictate the uses of the relevant public right. The options 
include the local government, the public at large, specific individuals, or a 
set of common law strictures. The Article constructs a test courts should 
employ when, in a given dispute over the use of a public space, they must 
pick among these alternatives. It does so by isolating the core normative 
concern animating the common law doctrines that deal with public spaces. 
The concern the Article identifies is the notion that some public spaces, but 
not others, have a natural use, and must thus be treated uniquely. In light 
of this core principle the Article develops an operative test to identify the 
“public” that should be afforded control over a given public space. Under 
the test, a court must determine whether a contested public space has a 
natural use, and if it does, how clearly defined that use is, who the actors 
funding the use are, and how trustworthy is the government when 
transacting in the space. To illustrate the test’s utility, it is employed to 
identify the pertinent publics that should control public rights in two of the 
most commonplace public spaces: parks and sidewalks.  
 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. For invaluable 
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I am grateful to David Dana, Nestor Davidson, Anna di Robilant, Nate Ela, Oren Kriegel, Timothy 
Mulvaney, Richard Schragger, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler. I also benefitted from the input 
of participants at the faculty workshop at Northwestern University School of Law, and at the Property 
Works in Progress Conference at Boston University School of Law. Finally, I am very thankful to Joey 
Becker, Thomas Lis, and Elliot Louthen who provided exceptional assistance in research. 
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The former President and First Lady picked the site for the future Obama 
Presidential Center at the conclusion of a competition pitting against each 
other four proposals hailing from three different cities.1 The winning bid 
singled out for the Center’s location Jackson Park in Chicago’s Hyde Park 
neighborhood,2 the area President Obama once represented in the Illinois 
state legislature. An ecstatic mayor and city council approved the project in 
2015.3 The project faced a legal challenge, however. A public interest group 
dedicated to the protection of open spaces has questioned the project’s 
legality.4 The group contends that Jackson Park, originally designed in 1870 
by the famed architects Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux, is subject 
to the public trust doctrine. Spaces governed by that doctrine must remain 
publicly owned and open—free, that is, of structures.5 The common law 
developed this venerable doctrine in the context of ownership rights in 
navigable waters and submerged land.6 The central question the parties to 
the Presidential Center litigation and the many intervening amici curiae—
 
1. Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, Chicago Wins Bid to Host Obama Library, N.Y. TIMES (May 
12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/us/chicago-president-obama-library.html [https://per 
ma.cc/7WYB-9YTY]. 
2. Act of Feb. 24, 1869, § 4, 1869 Ill. Laws 358, 359–60. 
3. CHI., ILL., ORDINANCE § O2015-192 (2015). 
4. Complaint, Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist., 368 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (N.D. Ill. 2019) 
(No. 18-cv-3424). 
5. See infra notes 135–142 and accompanying text. 













counting among them all existing U.S. presidential libraries,7  all major 
Chicago museums,8 and numerous law professors9—debate is whether the 
public trust doctrine also covers a park. If it does, the Presidential Center is 
doomed. For structures may not be erected on public trust land.10 
Other than timing, this case appears to share very little with another set 
of cases that has emerged recently: litigation over electric scooters. Electric 
scooters began appearing on city streets—starting in Santa Monica, 
California, and spreading to other cities in the United States and 
elsewhere11—in September 2017.12 Companies operating the service—first 
those dedicated solely to scooters, such as Lime and Bird, then those with 
broader transportation portfolios, such as Lyft and Uber—invite users to 
download a smartphone app which allows the user to locate an available 
scooter on a city’s sidewalk and unlock it.13 The user rides the unlocked 
scooter, and then drops it off when she arrives at her destination—leaving 
the scooter on the sidewalk to be located, and then unlocked, by the next 
user. Operators of the service have been embroiled in legal battles ever since 
its introduction.14 Upon the scooters’ first appearance, many cities issued 
cease-and-desist letters requiring that the scooters be removed from their 
 
7. Brief of Thirteen Presidential Foundations as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants’ Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings, Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist., 368 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (N.D. 
Ill. 2019) (No. 18-cv-3424). 
8. Brief of Amici Curiae the Eleven Park Museums in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings, Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist., 368 F. Supp. 3d 
1184 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (No. 18-cv-3424). 
9. Brief of Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants, Protect Our 
Parks, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist., 368 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (No. 18-cv-3424). 
10. The fact that the city will retain ownership rights to the land and merely lease it to the Obama 
Foundation, CHI., ILL., ORDINANCE § SO2018-7136 (2018), is thus immaterial, according to the 
plaintiffs. 
11. Megan Rose Dickey, The Electric Scooter Wars of 2018, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 23, 2018, 2:05 
PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/23/the-electric-scooter-wars-of-2018/ [https://perma.cc/Z65W-M 
CK2]. 
12. Noah Smith, Sudden Appearance of Electric Scooters Irks Santa Monica Officials, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 10, 2018, 6:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/sudden-appearance-of-electr 
ic-scooters-irks-santa-monica-officials/2018/02/10/205f6950-0b4f-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef_story.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/2JJT-BLCC]; Dara Kerr, Lyft’s Electric Scooters Hit the Streets of Santa Monica, 
CNET (Sept. 17, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/lyfts-electric-scooters-hit-the-streets-of-
santa-monica. 
13. Smith, supra note 12; Kerr, supra note 12. 
14. The companies have also been subject to a few private lawsuits, mostly focusing on issues 
of product liability. See, e.g., Borgia v. Bird Rides, Inc., No. CV 18-9685-DMG, 2019 WL 3814280 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2019). 












sidewalks.15 Several criminal prosecutions ensued,16 and some cease-and-
desist letters were challenged in court.17 Operators have further disputed 
more recent city ordinances that regulate the scooters’ access to sidewalks 
or cap their overall number.18 Operators argue that cities lack the power to 
thereby unilaterally control sidewalks.19 Cities respond by pointing at their 
general authorization to police sidewalks and by raising public nuisance tort 
claims against the operators.20 
The Presidential Center and electric scooters disputes seem wholly 
unrelated. Courts clearly treat them as such. They involve disparate legal 
doctrines—the public trust doctrine in the case of the Center,21  a city’s 
regulatory powers (and public nuisance law)22 in the case of the scooters. 
 
15. See, e.g., Cease and Desist Letter from Theresa Costonis, Metro. Attorney, Metro. Gov’t of 
Nashville & Davidson Cty., to Bird Rides, Inc. (May 8, 2018), https://media.bizj.us/view/img/1089561 
2/5-8-18-letter-to-m-shaw201805081518.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZW7-HRRH]; Faith E. Pinho & Ethan 
May, Bird Scooters Are Being Removed from Indianapolis. Here’s What Could Happen Next, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (July 12, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/07/12/bird-
scooters-removed-indianapolis-streets-follow-lime/780201002/ [https://perma.cc/6TTM-3ZAQ]; Rob 
Wile, Scooter Companies Pulling out of Miami Just Weeks After Making Their Debut, MIAMI HERALD 
(June 21, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/technology/article213523839. 
html [https://perma.cc/U484-2RWR].  
16. Press Release, City of Santa Monica, City Attorney Files Criminal Complaint Against Illegal 
Business Operations by Bird Rides, Inc. (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.santamonica.gov/press/2017/12/07 
/city-attorney-files-criminal-complaint-against-illegal-business-operations-by-bird-rides-inc [https://pe 
rma.cc/3RYM-HVJU]; Bird Rides, Inc. Takes Plea Deal and Will Pay $300,000, SANTA MONICA DAILY 
PRESS (Feb. 14, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.smdp.com/bird-rides-inc-takes-plea-deal-and-will-pay-
300000/164437 [https://perma.cc/NY5F-RVBB]; Ivan Moreno, Cities Grappling with How to Deal with 
Electric Scooters, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 12, 2018, 9:23 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2018/7/ 
12/18409176/cities-grappling-with-how-to-deal-with-electric-scooters [https://perma.cc/96XY-WWN 
L] (reporting that Nashville sued and then impounded all of Bird’s scooters). 
17. Erin Lisch, Lime Complying with Cease-and-Desist, but Bird Says Scooters Will Stay, RTV6 
(July 7, 2018, 3:36 PM), https://www.theindychannel.com/news/local-news/indianapolis/lime-to-pull-s 
cooters-off-indy-streets-following-cease-and-desist-letter [https://perma.cc/7YXX-4EKC] (reporting on 
Bird’s challenge to Indianapolis’s cease-and-desist letter). 
18. Andrew Giambrone, Scooter and Bike Companies Say D.C.’s New Rules for Dockless 
Vehicles Are Too Restrictive, CURBED WASH. DC (Nov. 17, 2018, 10:23 AM), https://dc.curbed.com/20 
18/11/17/18098426/dc-scooters-dockless-bikes-rules-cap-pushback [https://perma.cc/Q4ZS-JZY7]. 
19. See Moreno, supra note 16 (reporting that Bird argues that Milwaukee and Indianapolis could 
not treat the scooters as illegal). 
20. City of Milwaukee v. Bird Rides, Inc., No. 18-CV-1066-JPS, 2018 WL 5775920 (E.D. Wis. 
Nov. 2, 2018) (dismissing, on jurisdictional grounds, Milwaukee’s suit against Bird where the city 
justified its fine and forfeiture request through a public nuisance theory). 
21. A similar lawsuit against an expansion of a museum into a park—the American Museum of 
Natural History in New York’s Central Park—was pursued under a different legal theory. Plaintiffs 
relied, in a failed effort, on specific statutes that they claimed mandated certain procedures and reviews 
be followed. In re Cmty. United to Protect Theodore Roosevelt Park v. City of New York, 98 N.Y.S.3d 
576, 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
22. A public nuisance is a violation of a legal right common to the public as a whole. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(B) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Under the traditional common law 
public nuisance claims could only be brought by public officials, and still today almost all suits are 













Yet, this Article will argue, behind the distinct doctrinal headings lurks a 
common, and foundational, question that must be settled in both the 
Presidential Center case and in the scooter cases.  
Irrespective of their distinct doctrinal guises, in both courts are 
confronted with a stark choice. If the federal court in Illinois refuses to apply 
the public trust doctrine to the public space contested there—parks—it will 
thereby grant the power to draw the scope of allowable activities in that type 
of public space to the local government (i.e., the city will decide what 
structures can be built in parks). If, conversely, the court applies the public 
trust doctrine to parks, common law strictures will determine that scope 
(i.e., the court will decide which structures may, under the common law 
doctrine, be built in parks). If courts approve of cities’ attempts to ban 
electric scooters from the relevant public space—sidewalks—cities will be 
allowed to set the contours of allowable activities on that public space. If, 
conversely, courts accept the operators’ position, courts will allow private 
actors—individuals and businesses using the space—to make that 
determination.  
In other words, in these disputes courts must decide who holds the power 
to determine to what use, or uses, a public space will be put. A court must 
identify who, or what, is the “public” in a public space—the “public” that 
should actually control the public right in that space.  
And these two specific disputes are mere examples. The one question 
identified through them animates any case involving a public space. The 
disputes surrounding the Obama Presidential Center and the electric 
scooters are emblematic of prevalent, and ceaseless, conflicts over the 
design and regulation of public spaces—particularly when uses change or 
new uses are introduced. While current courts and commentators often 
conceive of each such dispute separately, applying to it the particular 
doctrinal set of rules implicated therein,23 the resolution of each and every 
 
23. The most prominent example of the tendency to analyze each relevant doctrine individually 
is the academic fascination with the public trust doctrine. The many works addressing the public trust 
doctrine attempt to explain that doctrine as a unique legal tool, or to expand its reach precisely because 
it is allegedly so unique. Therefore, these efforts inevitably largely isolate the doctrine from other legal 
doctrines and approaches to public spaces. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the 
Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a 
Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 422 (1997); James L. Huffman, A Fish out of 
Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 543 (1989); 
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006); Alexandra B. Klass, Fracking and the Public Trust Doctrine: A 
Response to Spence, 93 TEX. L. REV. 47 (2015); Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust 
Doctrine in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713 (1996); Symposium, The Public Trust Doctrine: 30 Years 
Later, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (2012). 












one of these disputes involves the need to answer that one basic inquiry 
identified here.  
That question—who should have the power to set the course for the given 
public space—is raised, for example, in disputes about the power of the city 
to remove statues commemorating Confederate soldiers and leaders from 
streets and squares over the state’s objections24 or those of the soldiers’ 
descendants; 25  in disputes over the power of private entities or 
neighborhood groups to place works of art of their choosing in the street or 
park;26 in disputes over the power of a city to bar an owner from placing his 
name or logo, in huge lettering, on a skyscraper facing the city’s most 
prominent public space;27 in disputes over a city’s power to force an owner 
to maintain a large advertisement sign atop a building once that sign has 
become closely associated with the city’s skyline;28 and more. Once we 
acknowledge the fact that all such disputes involve the same task of 
identifying the entity that should control the public space—and once we 
 
24. One example is the suit filed by Norfolk against Virginia, challenging the state statute barring 
cities from removing Confederate monuments. The city argues that the “monument is the City’s speech” 
rather than the state’s speech, and thus the state, by interfering in it, restricts the city’s First Amendment 
rights. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 3, City of Norfolk v. Virginia, No. 2:19-cv-
436 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2019). On state statutes preempting cities from removing Confederate 
monuments, see Zachary Bray, Monuments of Folly: How Local Governments Can Challenge 
Confederate “Statue Statutes,” 91 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2018).  
25. The Fifth Circuit has held that the Sons of Confederate Veterans lack standing to challenge 
the decision by the University of Texas at Austin and by the city of San Antonio to remove Confederate 
monuments. Rejecting their claim for a First Amendment injury, the court explained that “[t]he 
fundamental and fatal flaw with Plaintiffs’ argument is that they conflate agreeing with speech with 
authoring speech.” It gave short shrift to the argument that the plaintiffs were “among the intended 
beneficiaries” of the “public charitable gifts” that these monument were. It dismissed these arguments 
as “red herrings.” McMahon v. Fenves, 946 F.3d 266, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2020).  
26. Zachary Small, How Paparazzi Dogs and Rabbitgirl Conquered New York City Streets, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/arts/design/gillie-marc-schattner-sydney-a 
ustralia-art-paparazzi-dogs.html [https://perma.cc/79VS-HCP7] (debating public-private partnerships’ 
power to choose specific works of art—that many deem subpar—to be placed in public spaces in New 
York City). 
27. Emily Badger, Donald Trump Just Inspired Chicago to Rewrite the Rules on Absurdly Large 
Building Signs, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014, 10:49 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/ 
wp/2014/09/25/donald-trump-just-inspired-chicago-to-rewrite-the-rules-on-absurdly-large-building-sig 
ns/ [https://perma.cc/6A5G-6JSU] (discussing Chicago’s failed attempt to block the Trump 
Organization from placing a twenty-foot-high sign bearing the name on his hotel overlooking the 
Chicago River). 
28. Ellie French, City Commission Votes to Give Citgo Sign Landmark Status, BOS. BUS. J. (Nov. 
13, 2018, 8:06 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2018/11/13/city-commission-votes-to-g 
ive-citgo-sign-landmark.html [https://perma.cc/52R6-RMJT] (discussing the Boston Landmark 
Commission decision to landmark the Citgo sign located in Kenmore Square, thereby mandating its 
continued presence even after the owner of the building’s planned redevelopment); see also David W. 
Dunlap, Pepsi-Cola Sign in Queens Gains Landmark Status, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/nyregion/pepsi-cola-sign-in-queens-gains-landmark-status.html 
[https://perma.cc/77VZ-JPJP] (discussing New York City’s decision to protect from removal or 













develop a principled manner of approaching that task—disputes over public 
spaces can be resolved in a more consistent, and rational, manner. 
By approaching this task, and highlighting the stakes involved, this 
Article promotes a more sophisticated appreciation of the legal treatment of 
public spaces. Such better understanding is of the utmost importance. For 
public space is all around us. Not a day goes by during which the average 
individual does not interact with at least one public space. Merely by leaving 
their home, a person is confronted by the street. Even when staying indoors, 
the public space is inescapable—views and noises will likely invade any 
private space. Public spaces mold our lives—our public and private lives 
both.  
Accordingly, over the past decades, and with enhanced urgency in the 
last few years, commentators in a variety of fields have tackled these spaces’ 
treatment.29 Following Jane Jacobs’s pivotal study of cities, which tied their 
vitality to “[t]he ballet of the good city sidewalk,”30 scholars in sociology, 
psychology, and economics, as well as planners and designers, have all 
investigated the nature of sidewalks and other public spaces.31 They have 
produced a multitude of recommendations respecting the form such spaces 
should take and the uses to which they ought to be dedicated if public spaces 
are to foster better cities—and better lives for city dwellers.32 Pedestrian 
malls, greenery, public art, central squares fostering communal interaction, 
open vistas, bike lanes, and other suggestions have, thanks to these authors’ 
work, become staples of popular thought and practice respecting the shape 
of our public spaces.  
These highly impactful works from the social studies and the arts often 
leave one inescapable inquiry unaddressed, however. They overlook the 
question of how the decision to act on these suggestions—to maintain green 
 
29. Z. Muge Akkar, Questioning the “Publicness” of Public Spaces in Postindustrial Cities, 
16 TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS & SETTLEMENTS REV. 75, 75 (2005) (“Public spaces . . . have become the 
subject of renewed concern among design professionals and researchers for more than two decades.”). 
30. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 50 (Vintage Books ed. 
1992). 
31. See, e.g., STEPHEN CARR ET AL., PUBLIC SPACE (1992); Mark Francis, The Making of 
Democratic Streets, in PUBLIC STREETS FOR PUBLIC USE 23, 24–28 (Anne Vernez Moudon ed., 1987); 
Ali Madanipour, Public Space in the City, in DESIGN PROFESSIONALS AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT: 
AN INTRODUCTION 117 (Paul Knox & Peter Ozolins eds., 2000); FRANCIS TIBBALDS, MAKING PEOPLE-
FRIENDLY TOWNS: IMPROVING THE PUBLIC ENVIRONMENT IN TOWNS AND CITIES (1992); SHARON 
ZUKIN, THE CULTURES OF CITIES 49–78 (1995); Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Privatisation of Public 
Open Space: The Los Angeles Experience, 64 TOWN PLAN. REV. 139 (1993); Ali Madanipour, 
Dimensions of Urban Public Space, 1 URB. DESIGN STUD. 44 (1995); Ali Madanipour, Why Are the 
Design and Development of Public Spaces Significant for Cities?, 26 PLAN. & DESIGN 879 (1999); Don 
Mitchell, Introduction: Public Space and the City, 17 URB. GEOGRAPHY 127 (1996). 
32. For a recent review, see ERIC KLINENBERG, PALACES FOR THE PEOPLE: HOW SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CAN HELP FIGHT INEQUALITY, POLARIZATION, AND THE DECLINE OF CIVIC LIFE 
(2018). 












spaces, to place a work of public art, to close a street to traffic, to preserve 
vistas, etc.—is to be made and implemented.33 Yet that question—the legal 
question—is, as the Presidential Center and electric scooters examples 
highlight, unavoidable for the realization of any real-world proposal 
pertaining to public spaces.  
As those examples further illustrate, the question involves more than the 
mere allocation of ownership rights. Laypeople, lawmakers, and 
commentators too often assume that the main task of property law with 
respect to public spaces is to determine which spaces are public and which 
are private.34 Once the label of public—as opposed to private—is affixed to 
the space, most of the law’s work is, supposedly, done.35 That, however, 
simply is not the case in the examples provided above. The law clearly, and 
unquestionably, deems both the park and the sidewalks at issue in these 
disputes as publicly owned.36 Yet in order to actually settle the disputes, the 
law must do more; it must decide who that public owning the property 
actually is.  
This core theoretical insight of the Article builds on, and connects, 
important strands in two bodies of literature: property theory and local 
government law. Property theory, for more than a century, has focused on 
 
33. When debating the “publicness” of public spaces, non-legal works, naturally, address other, 
non-legal concerns. For example, they ask whether public space’s design and location augment 
stratification and gentrification, whether they serve a homogenous public and promote social filtering, 
and highlight the control over public uses now exercised through surveillance technologies. See, e.g., 
Akkar, supra note 29, at 75–76; Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus, The Public and the Private: Concepts 
and Action, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 3, 6 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983); 
Mike Davis, Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space, in VARIATIONS ON A THEME 
PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE 154 (Michael Sorkin ed., 1992).  
34. The first work to note the limits of the traditional, binary privately owned versus publicly 
owned approach was Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720 (1986). In this highly important work Rose argued that 
there are two forms of public property: one owned by the government, another, “inherently public 
property,” owned by the general public. She thus accurately expanded the traditional category of public 
property beyond the too constrictive private versus public distinction. However, this work too is focused 
on the specific ownership labels affixed to property—while somewhat expanding the number of labels—
rather than on powers of control. Further significant work in this field was done by Joseph Kearney and 
Thomas Merrill, who reviewed the old public dedication doctrine, which the modern common law 
abandoned, to highlight the promise and limits of a legal regime empowering specific individuals—but 
not others—to enforce public rights. They note how this approach diverges from current academic 
thinking which tends to assume that the public is a unitary category wholly distinct from the private. 
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, Private Rights in Public Lands: The Chicago Lakefront, 
Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication Doctrine, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1417, 1524 (2011). 
35. Compare with Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998) 
(criticizing practitioners and scholars of property while noting that “[l]abeling something as property 
does not predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it”).  
36. Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. 













deconstructing the concept of private ownership.37  The starting point is 
often found in Wesley Hohfeld’s celebrated assertion that ownership is not 
a unitary legal institution that conveys the same (and absolute) rights on all 
owners of all assets at all times.38 Rather, private property is a bundle of 
rights—a diverse and flexible assortment of entitlements leaving owners 
with varying powers and obligations that might change across owners and 
things owned.39  As part of the explosion in sophisticated writing about 
property theory over the past two decades,40 some scholars have tried to 
pinpoint the most important right in the ownership bundle, and to survey the 
variance in its potency across different settings. 41  Many scholars have 
zeroed in on the owner’s right to exclude others from her land, stressing that 
said entitlement enables the owner to set the contours for the land’s use.42 
One important recent contribution summarized such efforts by 
characterizing private property as the power to “set[] the agenda” for an 
asset.43 
This Article imports into the realm of public property a version of that 
line of thinking: the main task of the law of public property is to identify 
those actors who may set an agenda for public assets. It suggests that the 
 
37. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY 69, 69 (1980). 
38. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710–11, 743–44 (1917). 
39. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 
1044, 1086 (1984) (“[P]roperty is simply a label for whatever ‘bundle of sticks’ the individual has been 
granted.”). 
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ownership-focused approach to public property rights ought to be 
supplemented with, if not supplanted by, a version of this agenda-setting-
focused approach. 
This move will also connect the public property literature to the 
theoretical literature in the field of local government law. There, 
commentators stress that local power is a diverse concept that can be, and 
is, wielded by an exceptionally wide, and widening, group of actors.44 Local 
government law is a framework for allocating decision-making powers over 
public services and assets among governments operating on different 
levels—state and local.45 As recent writers explain, these levels themselves 
are also incredibly diverse internally. The local—as the alternative to the 
state—can be a city,46 a county,47 a special district,48 or a school district.49 
It can consist of elected officials or administrators.50 It can accommodate, 
in addition to these local level officers, micro-local level players of differing 
formal standings—a neighborhood referendum, a community board, etc.51  
Local government law thus not only determines what should be left to 
local, as opposed to state, level decision-making; it must also decide what, 
or who, is the “local” empowered to make the local decision. The idea that 
a key component of local government law is identifying the “local” 
appropriate for each case should be transported to property law’s thinking 
about public property—the task at hand is to identify the “public” 
appropriate in each case.  
The notion whereby singling out a space as subject to a public right is 
merely the first step in the analysis—whose following, more important step 
is identifying the relevant public—can thereby enrich our theoretical 
understanding of the concept of public property. It also aids in solving 
practical doctrinal challenges. The insight promoted here will refocus legal 
disputes on the meaningful question they involve—and away from the 
unhelpful issues currently preoccupying courts. For example, the important 
question should not be whether a park on which a presidential center is 
suggested has ever been submerged under water (and hence the public trust 
doctrine, under its historical reading, should be applied to it).52 Rather, it 
 
44. See generally Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323 (2014). 
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should be whether it is sensible to enable a city through its democratic 
processes to decide to which uses a park would be put.53 In addition to 
thereby isolating the true inquiry involved in such cases, the Article offers 
courts tools to tackle that inquiry. It develops tests that can be employed to 
determine who, or what, should have the power to direct the uses of a public 
space, such as a park: the local government, the public at large, an individual 
private owner, or a set of specific common law strictures.  
These tests for settling specific disputes will be derived from the 
considerations that have historically animated the common law in its 
dealings with public spaces. A myriad of common law rules determine what 
spaces can become public and how. The key theme the Article uncovers as 
holding together the historical and doctrinal experience of these diverse 
common law rules is the focus on discerning whether a given, contested 
public space has a “natural” or “innate” use.54 The Article thus suggests 
adopting this question as a criterion for also settling disputes over the use of 
public spaces. If a public space does not have such a use, then a court should 
refrain from intervening. Decisions respecting the space’s management, and 
potential changes to it, should be left to the relevant local government, as 
the public’s democratically elected representative.55 Only if, conversely, the 
public space does have a natural or innate use, should the court consider 
inserting itself into disputes over the space’s management. In these 
situations the court ought to evaluate the role and interests of the local 
government, the public at large, and those individual residents uniquely 
invested in the specific public space.56 In arbitrating the contest between 
these actors over decision-making powers in a public space that has an 
innate use, the court should consider the breadth of the space’s innate use 
(and its concomitant susceptibility to multiple interpretations), the identity 
of the parties liable to pay for maintaining the space, and finally, the 
potential for disinterested governmental decision-making in the specific 
circumstances.57  
To establish this test and thereby complete its doctrinal, normative, and 
theoretical tasks, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I maps out our law of 
public spaces as constructed by different elements of property law. It 
explains that the law must always first determine the scope of a public right 
and then identify the “public” controlling that right. Summarizing and 
bringing together existing doctrines often understood separately, the 
 
53. See infra Part III.A. 
54. See infra Part II. 
55. See infra Part II. 
56. See infra Part II. 
57. See infra Part II. 












organizational framework that Part I offers should be useful to future 
lawmakers and analysts independently of the value of the normative review 
that follows. Part II turns to the normative exploration and draws on the 
doctrines surveyed in Part I to isolate the considerations that must affect the 
law when it attempts to designate the “public” that should control a given 
public right. To illustrate the utility of the criteria thereby developed, Part 
III applies the tests to the cases of parks and sidewalks—thus reconsidering 
the challenges presented by the disputes over the Presidential Center and 
the electric scooters that launched the discussion.  
I. THE LAW OF PUBLIC SPACES 
In the modern market system, public rights are conceived as lying at the 
margins: the system prioritizes, and is sustained by, private property.58 
Property law doctrines thus focus on defining private rights and regulating 
conflicts between them;59 when public powers are considered, it is mostly 
as part of property law’s effort to police the risks these powers allegedly 
pose to private property.60 As a result, much of the law’s work in defining 
public rights is achieved through scattered doctrines, some of them only 
addressing the issue indirectly. To promote the Article’s goal of providing 
a better explanation of the law of public spaces, this Part assembles all these 
doctrines in an attempt to identify the overall structure they put in place. It 
argues that all the different property doctrines dealing with public spaces—
some of them never before even perceived as dealing with public spaces—
define those spaces by providing answers to two queries.  
The first inquiry the law must address with respect to each and every 
space pertains to the degree of publicness assigned to it. After the law 
thereby determines the public right’s strength, it must then decide how that 
right is to be filled with specific substance: the law needs to identify the 
person or entity empowered to define and manage the public right’s specific 
uses.  
The law first draws the external strength of the public right—it defines 
the right—and then it empowers a person or entity to define the internal 
contents of that public right—it defines the public. 
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A. Different Rights 
Any discussion of public spaces must commence with their definition. 
Unlike Roman law, the modern common law does not have a body of law 
specifically dealing with public spaces qua public spaces.61 It does not, 
therefore, readily provide a unitary definition for such spaces. Perhaps the 
most famous illustration of this lacuna is found in the refusal of the courts—
including the U.S. Supreme Court—to conclusively identify “public” 
spaces that, unlike “private” spaces, must be open to individuals exercising 
their First Amendment free speech rights.62 
This legal attitude, generating inconsistent results and frustrating many,63 
is in fact, however, in line with the position of most social scientists and 
planners. Works in those fields insist that the “publicness” of a space is a 
matter of degree.64 Spaces that are absolutely public are rare, as most spaces 
can be placed on a private to public spectrum.65  
This spectrum is embodied in the scheme the property doctrines relevant 
to such spaces produce. The regime these laws institute can best be 
understood as granting to the public entitlements of varying strengths to the 
benefits of different spaces. The greater the portion of a specific land’s 
fruits—in economic terms, the land’s rents—to which the public holds a 
legal right, the more public that space is rendered.66 The public’s right to a 
space’s rents can take one of three forms. The most robust public right is 
assured through ownership—since ownership supplies the owner, here the 
public, with all the residual rents from an asset. The least robust public rights 
are assured when the public has no entitlement to any rents from an asset 
but can block the asset’s owner from deriving a certain rent from the asset. 
In between are public rights affording the public some, albeit limited and 
specific, rents from an asset. Translating these options into formal legal 
categories, the public may have fee ownership rights in an asset (the 
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property). 
62. See, e.g., David Dana & Nadav Shoked, Public, by Necessity, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 
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63. See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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SPACE 11–12 (2004). 
65. Neil Smith & Setha Low, Introduction: The Imperative of Public Space, in THE POLITICS OF 
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strongest public right);67 it might have an easement in an asset—rights of 
access to, or use of, an asset owned by a private owner (a weaker public 
right);68 or it might benefit from a restriction—through a negative easement 
or a regulation—placed on the right of an owner to freely use her asset (the 
weakest public right).69  
Public fee ownership is the most straightforward form of a public right 
to a space. It is also inherently the most encompassing. Although 
ownership’s specific definition is hotly contested, it is undoubtedly the most 
robust property entitlement the law awards.70 If the public holds the fee 
interest over a space, the public’s standing is equivalent to that of the 
homeowner in her home. The public will thus hold the residual right to all 
the land’s benefits.71 Among the quintessential examples of spaces over 
which the public owns a fee interest, we often count city hall, public roads, 
or land submerged under water.72 
But the public might have rights in a certain road, or in the beach fronting 
the water, even without owning a fee interest therein.73 Properties that are 
privately owned by one person can be subject to another person’s right to 
access them: one neighbor can hold a right of way—an easement—over the 
land of the other neighbor.74 The same is true when the public is concerned: 
the public might hold an easement over privately owned land. As compared 
to a fee interest, an easement is less comprehensive. It is the right to do 
something—one specific thing—on someone else’s land.75 Thus, the holder 
of an easement—be it the neighbor or the public—is, unlike the holder of a 
fee interest, prohibited from altering the nature of her right, or from 
expanding it beyond its existing contours.76 The fee owner of a road might 
have the power to replace the road with a yard; the owner of an easement 
over the road does not have that power.77 She can only drive or walk along 
 
67. See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
68. See infra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. 
69. See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. 
70. SINGER, supra note 22, at 3 (contesting the idea of ownership as an absolute right, portraying 
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71. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2067 (2012) (arguing 
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76. See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Syracuse, 46 N.Y. 194, 199 (1871) (explaining that the owner 
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the road. Rights of passage through streets are the typical example for a 
public easement. 78  The historical right to roam that some systems 
recognize,79 and rights to hunt that are still protected in many states,80 are 
also examples of traditional public easements. More recently courts have 
similarly recognized public rights of access, for specific purposes, to private 
beaches.81 
The intuitive notion of a public right involves one of the two forms of 
right just reviewed: a publicly held fee interest or a publicly held easement, 
empowering the public to do many things (in the case of a fee right), or one 
thing (in the case of an easement right), in a given space. A somewhat less 
discussed form of public right, however, does not include such a freedom to 
act awarded to the public. While the typical right—public or otherwise—
takes the shape of the ability to do something on land, a right can also consist 
of the ability to block someone else from doing something on their land or 
to force them to do something there. 82  Thus a negative easement, for 
example, might empower an owner to stop her neighbor from building a 
second floor that will block the views from the owner’s house; or a covenant 
might empower the owner to force the neighbor to maintain that neighbor’s 
yard or pay homeowners association fees.83 The public similarly can, and 
does, enjoy such rights to interfere with another owner’s freedom. Historic 
preservation regulations (barring an owner from altering her landmarked 
building) 84  or conservation easements (prohibiting an owner from 
disturbing the natural or scenic values of her land)85 are examples.86 The 
public does not own,87 or even have a right to enter, the landmarked building 
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81. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
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owner. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. City of New York, 623 N.E.2d 526, 530 (N.Y. 1993). 












or the nature preserve.88 It still, however, controls, to some degree, those 
spaces’ uses, and, at least allegedly, derives a benefit from the fact that 
certain uses (namely, development) are prohibited there. Hence, these, too, 
are public rights in a space. 
B. Different Publics 
Public rights in property thus differ in strength: from the all-
encompassing fee interests, through the more partial easements, to the most 
limited negative easements or regulations. Regardless of its location on this 
strength continuum, a given public right, like any other right, must be filled 
with specific content. Fee ownership can translate into many different 
modes of developing the owned land; an easement, such as a right of way, 
can be employed in different fashions (for example, travel by pedestrians 
versus by cars) and for different purposes (for example, for ingress and 
egress purposes alone versus for recreational purposes); a negative 
easement or regulation restricting another’s use of her land can bar (or not 
bar) different activities. Furthermore, even once initially defined, the 
manner of employment of any of the rights need not be constant—it might 
be allowed to change over time. The desired pattern of development of the 
land held under a fee interest can perhaps shift (say from open space to 
residential development); the easement’s uses or purposes can expand (say 
adding cars to pedestrians and recreation to ingress and egress); a negative 
easement or regulation restricting the development of a lot can be adjusted 
or lifted (in exchange for consideration or to allow a development desirable 
to both parties). After a right has been recognized and protected from 
outsiders, that is, the law must still determine the modes and goals of its 
exercise, and the ability to alter these later on.  
For private rights this challenge—of filling a right with specific 
contents—is normally not particularly taxing. It is for the right’s owner to 
set the agenda for its use—subject to agreements with others and to any 
other existing legal restrictions.89 The right-holder is a specific person (real 
or legal) and it is for her—subject to the law—to choose what to do with her 
right, once that right is recognized.90 For public rights, however, this move 
is more complicated. Decisions respecting the use of a right are to be made 
 
88. E.g., Nicholas Caros, Note, Interior Landmarks Preservation and Public Access, 116 
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ordinance does not allow the commission, probably, to force owners to permit the public’s entry into 
protected interiors).  
89. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 287 
(2008) (explaining the role of the owner as setting an agenda subject to obligations such as a covenant). 













by the right’s holder, and the holder of the right in these cases is the public. 
But who or what exactly is “the public”?  
“Publics are queer creatures. You cannot point to them, count them, or 
look them in the eye.”91 The problem is particularly daunting from a legal 
perspective, as no legal category plainly corresponds to the term “public.” 
So, in the case of each and every one of the public rights just described—
public fee ownership, public easement, public restriction—what is the 
“public”? Identifying the holder of the “public” right over a space, the 
“public” that can then determine the right’s mode of employment, is not a 
straightforward task. Works in cultural studies and the social sciences attest 
to its difficulty. Some scholars view the definition of the public as the result 
of a political or class struggle.92 Others present it as the collective product 
of negotiation and coordination. 93  Still other scholars insist on the 
recognition of a counterpublic—a subculture requiring its own public 
spaces. 94  Certain commentators thus conclude that there simply is no 
general idea of the public: the public is whatever people in a particular place 
and context think it is.95  
The law, perhaps unsurprisingly, concurs: it does not assume a unitary 
and fixed concept of a public. It does not even engage the task of identifying 
the public directly. The law only touches upon the task indirectly when 
setting the ways in which the public rights described in the preceding section 
are acquired. In those situations, the law simply cannot avoid the task. 
Doctrines governing the creation of a right must identify the act necessary 
for the right’s creation; in the process, they also have to identify the actor 
responsible for the creation. Accordingly, the doctrines regulating the 
acquisition of a public right inescapably discern a public—the specific actor 
creating that right. Therefore, through a review of these doctrines we can 
ascertain the different publics the law currently recognizes.  
Public rights can be acquired in four different ways: by governmental 
act, through a market conveyance, following the passage of time, and 
automatically. Each of these modes operates through specific legal doctrines 
which can generate public rights of different strength stripes (fee, easement, 
restriction), though not necessarily of all strength stripes (for example, the 
passage of time cannot result, in American law, in a restriction).96 Each also, 
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as shall be seen now as the four will be reviewed in turn, imagines a different 
“public.” 
The first, and perhaps most intuitive, way through which the public 
acquires property is through an act of the government—the entity that is the 
public’s organized form.97  American law endows government with two 
powers that enable it to generate public property rights: eminent domain and 
the police power. The eminent domain power allows the government to 
take, for a public use, property from a private owner in exchange for just 
compensation.98 The power can thus be used to acquire public fee interests 
or public easements. 99  The police power authorizes the government to 
regulate the uses of land without compensating the affected owner. 100 
Through the police power the government can thus place public restrictions, 
such as historic preservation ordinances, on private land.101  
Both these powers are wholly governmental: the government exercises 
the eminent domain and police powers and acquires any resultant rights. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the determination whether to 
turn to the eminent domain power is the government’s alone to make.102 
Thus a court will not second-guess the government’s decision to acquire 
property through eminent domain. 103  Plaintiffs arguing that the 
government’s decision is wrong-headed, or that the specific taking will not 
serve a truly public goal (for example, when used for economic 
development) will normally fail.104 Similarly, individual petitioners cannot 
force the government to take property to create a road they deem 
desirable.105 The rule is even clearer with respect to the police power: the 
constitutional nondelegation doctrine bars governments from transferring to 
 
97. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Essay, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1412, 1426 (2006). 
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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W. Chi. Park Comm’rs v. W. Union Tel. Co., 103 Ill. 33 (1882); Crystal Lake Park Dist. v. Consumers 
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Cty. v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874); Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234 (1871). For 
examples of a taking of land for highways, see 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 924 (3d ed. 1939); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 712 (2017) (empowering towns to take property 
for laying highways). For examples of taking of an easement, see City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A.2d 
382 (Me. 1970); Hartford v. Gilmanton, 146 A.2d 851, 853 (N.H. 1958). 
100. See, e.g., Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning 
and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 103 (2011). 
101. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978). 
102. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
103. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 (1984) (“[O]ur cases make clear that 
empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of 
socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”). 
104. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). 













others the police power.106 Government may not permit other entities to 
create or enforce public restrictions. 107  Consequently, the “public,” for 
purposes of acquiring public rights through government power (eminent 
domain or police power), is, perhaps unsurprisingly, the government. 
That is not necessarily the case where other doctrines generating public 
rights are concerned. The second manner of creating a public right is 
through a market conveyance. Eminent domain and the police power are 
doctrines that may force an owner to part ways with a right for the benefit 
of the public, but an owner can also choose to do so of her own volition. 
She can convey a property right to the public as a gift or in the course of an 
exchange. Gifts of a fee or easement right to the public108 are regulated 
through the doctrine of dedication. 109  A dedication is a donation of an 
owner’s property to the public’s use.110 It thus consists of an offer by the 
owner and an acceptance by the public.111  
Since a dedication is grounded in the offer an owner makes, its contours 
are defined in that offer.112 The granting owner defines the right created: she 
sets the uses to which the gifted public right will be put, and she might add 
 
106. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
107. N. Am. Commercial Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 110, 137 (1898) (“[G]overnmental 
powers cannot be contracted away . . . .”).  
108. At its inception the dedication doctrine only allowed for the grant of easements to the public 
for use of highways and bridges. The first case mentioning the term dedication is Lade v. Shepherd, 
(1732) 2 Str. 1004, 93 Eng. Rep. 997 (KB). American courts expanded the doctrine, applying it to 
squares and parks: the first such application was in Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Vt. 279 (1830); see also EMORY 
WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 208 (4th ed. 1885) 
(declaring that result can be assumed to form part of the country’s common law). American courts thus 
enabled the dedication not only of easements, but also of fee interests. As the Supreme Court explained, 
“[i]f this is the doctrine of the law applicable to highways, it must apply with equal force, and in all its 
parts, to all dedications of land to public uses.” President, Recorder & Trs. of Cincinnati v. Lessee of 
White, 31 U.S. 431, 437–38 (1832). 
109. A special doctrine is necessary since the law makes it impossible for an owner to convey 
property rights to the public through a normal conveyance. For a conveyance of land to be valid, the law 
requires that it detail both the identity of the land’s current owner and the identity of that to whom 
ownership is transferred: identifiable grantors and grantees. See, e.g., Durbin v. Bennett, 31 F. Supp. 24, 
26 (E.D. Ill. 1939) (omission of grantee invalidates transaction under Illinois law); Henniges v. Paschke, 
84 N.W. 350, 351 (N.D. 1900); Brugman v. Charlson, 171 N.W. 882 (N.D. 1919); State v. McGee, 204 
N.W. 408, 409 (Iowa 1925). Since, by definition, the public is not an identifiable person or entity, a 
conveyance to “the public,” or to the residents of an area, is invalid. Hunt v. Tolles, 52 A. 1042, 1045 
(Vt. 1902); City of Ardmore v. Knight, 270 P.2d 325, 327–28 (Okla. 1954). Hence the law required the 
special doctrine of dedication. 
110. City of Fairfield v. Jemison, 218 So. 2d 273, 275 (Ala. 1969). 
111. Miller v. Fowle, 206 P.2d 1106, 1106, 1108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (“Dedication is a matter of 
contract requiring an offer and an acceptance.”). 
112. Lambright v. Trahan, 322 S.W.3d 424, 431 (Tex. App. 2010). 












restrictions and conditions.113 Courts hold that the grantor’s intent controls, 
and thus the terms of the dedication will be strictly construed.114 If, for 
example, an owner dedicates land for use as a street alone, the local 
government may not convert that area to another use;115 if that granting 
owner specifies that railcars may not use the street, a rail may not be 
added;116 if the dedicating owner orders that the land serve as a park, the 
construction of a fire house will be enjoined;117 if she instructs that the 
donated public facility be freely accessed, fees—even if necessary—cannot 
be charged.118  
To complete a dedication, the offer the owner makes must be accepted. 
The recipient of a dedication is the public at large119—rather than any 
individual120 or entity,121 such as the government.122 But the government 
accepts the offer on the public’s behalf,123 and can thus, like the offering 
 
113. Lynchburg Traction & Light Co. v. City of Lynchburg, 128 S.E. 606, 609 (Va. 1925) 
(“Dedication of a highway is a mere gift to the public, and the donor may annex thereto any restriction 
or condition he pleases, not inconsistent with or repugnant to the gift. Otherwise, there would be no gift. 
The donee cannot dictate the terms of the gift. He can accept or not, as he pleases. If he accepts 
unconditionally, he thereby agrees to perform the conditions annexed to the gift.”). 
114. Lander v. Vill. of S. Orange, 279 A.2d 633, 637 (N.J. 1971). 
115. Dunnick v. Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Neb. 1974) (Newton, J., 
concurring). 
116. Lynchburg Traction & Light Co., 128 S.E. at 610. Similarly, if the corporation developing a 
seaside resort dedicated land to public use as open space so as not to block residences’ ocean view, the 
government that accepted the dedication on those terms could not later on propose structures on that 
land. Poole v. Comm’rs of Rehoboth, 80 A. 683 (Del. Ch. 1911); see also Attorney Gen. v. Vineyard 
Grove Co., 64 N.E. 75 (Mass. 1902). 
117. Quinn v. Dougherty, 30 F.2d 749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (holding that where land and a view 
of the sea from a certain bluff above land have been acquired by the public by dedication, the local 
government cannot license structures on land beneath bluff that obstruct the view); Hill v. Borough of 
Belmar, 127 A. 789 (N.J. 1925). 
118. Lander, 279 A.2d at 639. 
119. In this manner a dedication differs from other conveyances (grants and typical gifts): the law 
normally requires that a recipient in a conveyance be identified. Magnolia Mem’l Gardens, Inc. v. 
Denton, 317 So. 2d 38, 42 (Miss. 1975). 
120. Roma Dev. Corp. v. Jones, 115 N.Y.S.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952). 
121. Cent. Veterans’ Ass’n of Stamford v. City of Stamford, 101 A.2d 281, 283–84 (Conn. 1953). 
An exception recognized by American courts is that a particular religious group or church could be the 
recipient of a dedication. See, e.g., Comm’rs of Wyandotte Co. v. First Presbyterian Church, 1 P. 109 
(Kan. 1883). 
122. Lander, 279 A.2d 633 (explaining that the government cannot be the recipient of a 
dedication). 
123. The dedication may be accepted through a formal act of the relevant authority, say through a 
municipal ordinance. McBroom v. Jackson Cty., 154 So. 3d 827, 836 (Miss. 2014). Acceptance can also 
be expressed through the less formal governmental act of simply assuming jurisdiction over the space—
for example, possessing or maintaining it—or “some [other] act which unequivocally shows an intent to 














owner, define the dedicated rights in the deed accepting the dedication.124  
The same is true when public rights are created through more 
straightforward private conveyances: a private gift to the government 
(rather than to the public at large as in a dedication) or a deal with the 
government.125 The parties to the transaction—the granting individual and 
the grantee government—create the right: they define the right the public 
acquires and its contours.126 Conservation easements are a useful example. 
An owner grants a conservation easement to the government or to a 
designated charitable organization in exchange for a federal tax benefit.127 
The terms of the conservation easement created—the specific developments 
it bars—are defined in the state statute permitting such easements’ creation 
and in the federal tax code providing the consideration for the grant of a 
conservation easement.128 The transfer of a conservation easement typifies 
the inevitable dynamics of any transaction: the parties to the transaction 
prescribe its terms. Thus, under the laws regulating the acquisition of public 
rights through market transfers—a dedication or a typical conveyance—the 
“public” is both the government and, often to a still greater extent, the 
original private owner initiating the transfer.129 
The third mode of creating public rights—the passage of time—
introduces yet another notion of the “public.” Market conveyances, like 
those just reviewed, are the archetypical manner in which property rights 
are transferred in our property law system. But the system also recognizes 
transfers resulting not from such agreements of the parties involved, but 
from the passage of time.130 Through adverse possession, an individual or 
 
124. See, e.g., Miller v. Fowle, 206 P.2d 1106, 1107–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (the developer of a 
subdivision that straddled the boundary between the cities of Oakland and Berkeley offered to dedicate 
a street therein, and while the offer was accepted by Oakland, it was rejected by Berkeley).  
125. Government enjoys the power held by all market participants to purchase property. United 
States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 315–16 (1876) (explaining that “the power of acquiring property for public 
purposes in any part of the country, by all the usual methods known to the law, is an essential attribute” 
of a government’s sovereignty); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 26 (2017) (empowering government 
to buy land for highways). Thus it can also accept a gift from a landowner. City of Norfolk v. Meredith, 
132 S.E.2d 431, 434–35 (Va. 1963). 
126. See, e.g., People ex rel. Bd. of Park Comm’rs v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 
240 (1873) (discussing the municipal acquisition of lands for one of Detroit’s important parks); Holt v. 
City Council of Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 410 (1879) (same). 
127. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c) (2018) (qualifying the donation of a conservation easement as tax 
deductible); see also Janet L. Madden, Tax Incentives for Land Conservation: The Charitable 
Contribution Deduction for Gifts of Conservation Easements, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 105 (1983). 
128. See 4 POWELL, supra note 85, § 34A.03. 
129. In a dedication, the intent of the grantor might enjoy an elevated status as compared to the 
intent of the government. Unlike when public rights are acquired through eminent domain or purchase, 
in the dedication context the terms will be construed against the governmental grantee. Lander v. Vill. 
of S. Orange, 279 A.2d 633, 637 (N.J. 1971).  
130. SINGER, supra note 22, at 140. 












entity can lose her fee ownership rights in a piece of land to another 
individual or entity who has been possessing the land for a statutorily-set 
number of years.131 As any other entity, the government can gain in this 
manner the property that its agents have possessed for a lengthy time.132 For 
example, if a municipal office building encroaches on neighboring privately 
owned land, the government can obtain fee title to that land through adverse 
possession.133  
The passage of time can also, however, generate public rights of a 
different sort—and with a different notion of the public. Although courts 
have traditionally held that only identifiable actors can resort to an adverse 
possession claim,134 the common law has allowed the general public—the 
quintessential unidentifiable actor—to acquire certain rights through the 
passage of time by relying on doctrines other than adverse possession.135 
The most notable doctrines employed for this purpose have been implied 
dedication, which generates fee interests in the public, and prescriptive 
easement, which generates public easement rights.136  
 
131. Id. 
132. 10 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.15 (3d ed. 1999) (“A 
municipality, like an individual, may acquire title to land by adverse possession, where the elements 
necessary for the establishment of such a right are present, and where the adverse possession may be 
deemed to be the official act of the municipal corporation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
133. See, e.g., Levering v. City of Tarpon Springs, 92 So. 2d 638, 638 (Fla. 1957) (municipal 
waterworks mistakenly constructed partially on private land); Johnson v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 713 
S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Morgan v. Cherokee Cty. Bd. of Educ., 58 So. 2d 134, 
135 (Ala. 1952) (school building); Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911, 917 (Conn. 1982) 
(allowing for adverse possession of a beach, because it was not just a use by the unorganized public, but 
by the organized city that maintained the beach, placed life-guards there, etc.). Courts have held that the 
government acquisition of private property through adverse possession does not constitute an 
unconstitutional taking. City of Des Plaines v. Redella, 847 N.E.2d 732, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); 
Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 A.2d 592, 603 (Me. 2001); Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Alaska 
1993). The one outlier is Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 227 (D.R.I. 
2002), aff’d on other grounds, 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003). 
134. Roche, 442 A.2d at 916 (“[T]he unorganized public cannot acquire rights by prescription.”); 
3 TIFFANY, supra note 99, § 1193 (“The public cannot, strictly speaking, acquire rights by 
prescription.”). The traditional reasoning is that possession by the general public—unlike possession by 
an identifiable government unit—can never meet certain elements required for a successful adverse 
possession claim, such as hostility and exclusivity. Hostile possession implies that the owner could have 
sued the possessor in trespass seeking her removal. But the “public” is an indeterminate entity and thus 
cannot be sued. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND 
§ 4:39 (2019); Note, Dedication of Land to the Public, 14 HARV. L. REV. 59, 65 (1900). 
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST. 2000). 
136. The doctrine of custom, recognized in a very small number of states, performs a similar 
function in a less formal manner. The leading case recognizing a public right to use private property 
based on custom is State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). The court found that the 
public had used the dry-sand area of a beach above the high-water mark “according to an unbroken 
custom running back in time as long as the land has been inhabited.” Id. at 676–77. The case’s impact 














The theories animating these two doctrines diverge. The doctrine of 
prescriptive easements is grounded in the notion that over time a non-
permissive use of land (such as passage over it) matures into a right.137 
Implied dedication, for its part, is grounded in the notion that an owner can 
express her desire to award rights to the public, through dedication, not only 
by making an explicit offer as discussed above, but also implicitly, for 
example by acquiescing to repeated public use of her property.138  
Still, in most states the two doctrines have, over time, come to be applied 
in a similar, if not wholly identical, manner.139 The most recent Restatement 
thus recommends discarding the implied dedication doctrine in this regard, 
and sole reliance on the prescriptive easement doctrine. 140  Clearly, the 
doctrines now focus on the same one element. In current law, the key 
element allowing the public to acquire a right through either of the two 
doctrines is proof that members of the public have been using a private 
owner’s land in a distinct manner for a long period of time.141 Once such a 
pattern of consistent use by the general public is established, the public is 
awarded the permanent right to continue that specific use.142  
 
Highway Comm’n v. Bauman, 517 P.2d 1202 (Or. App. 1974). Only four other jurisdictions adopted 
expressly some version of the custom theory in beach access and use cases. United States v. St. Thomas 
Beach Resorts, 386 F. Supp. 769 (D.V.I. 1974); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 
73 (Fla. 1974); Cty. of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1973); In re Application of Ashford, 440 
P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968); Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). The Texas Supreme 
Court has more recently disapproved of the doctrine. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 728 (Tex. 
2012). Other states explicitly rejected it. Smith v. Bruce, 244 S.E.2d 559 (Ga. 1978); Dep’t of Nat. Res. 
v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630 (Md. 1975). 
137. Originally, English courts based adverse possession and prescriptive easements on a fiction 
of a “lost grant.” But American law—as English law—has mostly abandoned the theory. 7 JAMES L. 
BROSS ET AL., THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.03(b)(6)(ii) (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2006); 
see, e.g., Elmer v. Rodgers, 214 A.2d 750, 752 (N.H. 1965) (rejecting the “lost grant” theory of 
prescription, and finding that the true policy behind prescription is the “stabilization of long continued 
property uses,” similar to the policy underlying adverse possession); see also Hunt Land Holding Co. v. 
Schramm, 121 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). 
138. City of Norfolk v. Meredith, 132 S.E.2d 431, 434 (Va. 1963) (finding that intent to dedicate 
land “may be implied from [the landowner’s] actions and the long use of his land by the public”). 
139. Clay Alger, Use Interrupted: The Complicated Evolution of Utah’s Highway Dedication 
Doctrine, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1613, 1621. 
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. f. 
141. For examples of continued public use serving to establish dedication, see Stecklein v. City 
of Cascade, 693 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Iowa 2005); Hollywood, Inc. v. Zinkil, 403 So. 2d 528, 535 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(2)(a) (West 2020) (“A highway is dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period of 10 years.”). For examples of such use generating a public right of way through prescriptive 
easement, see Thorsteinson v. Largaud, 284 P. 92, 93 (Wash. 1930); Dutton v. Slayton, 593 P.2d 1071, 
1072 (N.M. 1979); Zakutansky v. Kanzler, 634 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); State ex rel. Game, 
Forestation & Parks Comm’n v. Hull, 97 N.W.2d 535, 535 (Neb. 1959). 
142. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-201(1)(c) (West 2019) (“The following are declared 
to be public highways: . . . All roads over private lands that have been used adversely without interruption 
 












In other words, through its past use the general public dictates the 
creation of a permanent public right and its contours. The public’s use 
defines, for example, the line and width of a road acquired through 
continued use.143 It similarly sets the purposes for which the right gained 
over a space can be put: if the public, for example, is found to have 
established a right over a beach through a long-practice of fishing there, the 
resultant permanent right is restricted to fishing, and would not include 
camping or driving.144 As these examples illustrate, under the doctrines 
governing the acquisition of public rights through the passage of time, the 
“public” creating rights is the public at large. 
A fourth, and final, mechanism for creating public rights exists—and it 
has its own definition of the “public.” The three mechanisms reviewed so 
far are all ways in which private property becomes subjected to public 
rights. Governmental act, market conveyance, and the passage of time are 
manners through which private property is wholly or partially transformed 
into public property. But the common law also recognizes a group of 
properties that need not be transformed into public: properties that are 
automatically public.145 This unique result is achieved through the public 
trust doctrine.146 Lands that the doctrine covers must remain public and 
cannot be transferred to private parties. 147  They are held by the 
government—but only as a trustee.148 The beneficiary of the interest in the 
land, and thus its true owner, is the public at large.149 Consequently, the 
government (unlike a typical property owner) cannot freely convey assets it 
holds under the public trust doctrine.150 Since it holds them “in trust in 
 
or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive years . . . .”); Dunnick v. 
Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Neb. 1974) (“[T]he nature of public rights in a 
highway acquired by prescriptive use should be equated with those flowing from an implied dedication 
of the land as a road or highway.”). 
143. 4 TIFFANY, supra note 99, § 1211. The public’s original use, for example, determines whether 
the side ditches are included in the public right of way. Bd. of Sup’rs of Tazewell Cty. v. Norfolk & W. 
Ry. Co., 91 S.E. 124, 128–29 (Va. 1916). 
144. Margit Livingston, Public Access to Virginia’s Tidelands: A Framework for Analysis of 
Implied Dedications and Public Prescriptive Rights, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 669, 689–91 (1983). 
145. Perhaps a better term is “inherently public” which was coined in an important work by Carol 
Rose, who uses it in a slightly broader way. Rose, supra note 34, at 713. 
146. At least one state allows for property to be deemed automatically public through another 
doctrine. In Minnesota, a public cartway is automatically created to serve landlocked lands under certain 
conditions. MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subdiv. 2 (2014). 
147. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
148. Joseph L. Sax, Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural Property Protection 
in England, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1543, 1558 (1990) (“[P]ublic trust properties reflect profoundly important 
traditions, sharing both the notion of inalienable rights inhering in the community as a collectivity, and 
the concept of owner as trustee . . . .”). 
149. Rung v. Shoneberger, 2 Watts 23, 25–26 (Pa. 1833) (explaining that government’s ownership 
of square is “qualified”; city is “trustee” for the public’s “use”). 













perpetuity for the free and unimpeded use of the general public,”151 it can 
only transfer these properties in a manner that promotes the trust’s goals.152  
The two decisions relevant to the acquisition of public trust properties—
what properties are subject to the doctrine and when can such properties be 
transferred away from the public—are dictated by the common law.153 
English courts first developed the public trust doctrine and applied it to tidal 
waters and the land they submerge.154 Starting in the nineteenth century 
many American courts, interpreting the common law, expanded the doctrine 
to any navigable waters.155 More recently, some courts have also deemed 
varying portions of the beach fronting such waters to be public trust 
properties.156 One court broadened the doctrine to cover water even when 
used as a resource,157 and at least one other appeared willing to recognize a 
park as subject to the public trust.158 Starting in the 1970s, commentators 
have called for even further expansion of the common law doctrine to cover 
other spaces: for example environmental resources,159 or publicly enjoyed 
views.160 Different courts have thus applied the doctrine to different spaces, 
and some advocates are urging courts to apply it to still other spaces. 
A similar diversity of attitudes characterizes judicial decisions respecting 
the occasions when land recognized as subject to the public trust can be 
transferred away to private uses. Thus, for example, one court found that 
land subject to the public trust could be developed as a football stadium 
 
151. Hope M. Babcock, Using the Federal Public Trust Doctrine to Fill Gaps in the Legal Systems 
Protecting Migrating Wildlife from the Effects of Climate Change, 95 NEB. L. REV. 649, 674 (2017). 
152. Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild 
Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things that Go Bump in the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 
849, 888–98 (2000). 
153. See Union Square Park Cmty. Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 8 N.E.3d 
797, 801 (N.Y. 2014) (explaining that under the public trust doctrine, “it is for the courts to determine 
what is and is not a park purpose”); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 34, at 1523–24. 
154. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 635–38 (1986). 
155. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust 
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 828 (2004). 
156. SINGER, supra note 22, at 88–89. 
157. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). More 
recently, a lower California court applied the doctrine to groundwater as well. Envtl. Law Found. v. 
State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583, 2014 WL 8843074, at *7 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 
15, 2014). The Hawaii Constitution explicitly subjects water resources to the doctrine, HAW. CONST. 
art. XI, §§ 1, 7, and courts have recognized a broad rule of standing allowing citizens to sue, ‘O Haleakala 
v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 317 P.3d 27, 46 (Haw. 2013). 
158. See Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chi., 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970). 
159. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970). 
160. Hope Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public Parkland from Visual 
Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2015). 












serving an NFL team,161 while another found that that same kind of land 
could not be developed as a private university campus.162 In light of such 
decisions, commentators note that the public trust doctrine lacks any 
discernable standards despite its pretenses at objectivity.163 At the end of the 
day it confers almost full control on courts. 164  Courts, at their own 
discretion, decide what properties become public under the public trust 
doctrine and which of those must always remain public. This compelling 
realist insight notwithstanding, the public trust doctrine still imagines the 
public interest in certain properties as defined by a set of specific common 
law strictures.165 Since such supposed strictures, in a common law system, 
are judge-made, some level of inconsistency, and even mistake, might be 
inevitable. Still the “public” responsible for the acquisition of public rights 
through the public trust doctrine is a set of common law dictates—as filtered 
by judges. 
Each of the four different modes of creating public rights—governmental 
act, market conveyance, passage of time, and properties that are 
automatically public—thus identifies a different actor as the right’s creator. 
They thereby suggest to us the different options that might stand for the 
“public” in a public right: the government, a specific private actor, the 
public at large, or common law strictures. The law imagines a varied number 
of publics for the diverse public rights—fee, easement, restriction—it 
recognizes. But which of these publics should be chosen in a given case to 
hold the public right at issue after its creation? What logic should be guiding 
the law in making the choice among the different legal publics? Those are 
the questions I turn to next.  
II. WHO SHOULD THE PUBLIC BE 
Part I’s description of the law of public spaces established that aside from 
determining what types of rights the public can hold—a relatively 
straightforward task as those rights track recognizable private property law 
categories—the law must also determine who the “public” holding those 
rights is. That assignment is more challenging. The different entities capable 
 
161. Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 170 (Ill. 2003) (explaining that 
although the private NFL team will benefit from using a stadium, the public will enjoy it as well and 
thus the public trust doctrine is not violated). 
162. Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(explaining that although the public will benefit from certain elements of the project, such as a beach, 
the primary beneficiary will be the university that will enlarge its campus). 
163. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 34, at 1523–24. 
164. Id. 
165. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 













of standing for the “public” can, as was established, be discerned through 
an examination of the disparate doctrines governing the creation of public 
property rights. But those doctrines do not necessarily dictate who the 
“public” holding the public rights—once they are created—should be. The 
doctrines reviewed tell us who the “public” holding a public right might be, 
not who it should be in a given public space. Disputes like those surrounding 
the Presidential Center or the electric scooters mentioned in the Introduction 
involve spaces where the public rights have already been created. Indeed, in 
these and most similar cases, the public right at issue was created a long 
time ago.166 The right’s ancient source does not represent a particularly 
useful factor in settling a contemporary dispute over who should hold the 
right and set its uses.  
At the same time, the normative themes animating the doctrines for 
public rights’ original acquisition can instruct us on the relevant 
considerations that should be taken into account when settling current 
disputes over existing public rights. This Part thus first isolates the 
normative considerations animating the laws governing the creation of 
public spaces as just reviewed, and then relies on those normative 
considerations to develop a principled test for determining who the “public” 
that controls the use of an existing public right should be.  
A. The Law of Public Spaces’ Normative Theme 
The central doctrines that constitute our law of public spaces as surveyed 
in Part I appear wholly disparate: covering different spaces, generating 
different rights, mandating different modes of acquisition, and identifying 
different publics. Still, despite all these differences, it is perhaps not 
particularly surprising that certain common themes, or concerns, can be 
detected pervading all of them; after all, the doctrines share a subject 
matter—public spaces. The most salient of these normative themes, this 
Section will argue, is the notion that certain spaces subject to public rights—
but not other spaces similarly subject to public rights—have a specific use 
that is inescapable and innate to them.  
The public trust doctrine, with which the preceding Part concluded its 
exploration into the American law of public spaces, is a convenient starting 
point for an exploration into the normative principles animating that body 
of law. The legal determination that some spaces are automatically public, 
and also, consequently, must at all times be put to a given, and unchanging, 
 
166. Jackson Park, the site of the presidential library, was created as a public space in 1869. See 
supra note 2. Sidewalks in America were created as public spaces in the late nineteenth century. See 
infra note 285 and accompanying text. 












use, is a glaring exception to the general pattern of our legal system. Almost 
everywhere else, that system is deeply committed to the free flow of 
assets. 167  The public trust doctrine materializes as a strikingly unique 
mechanism, put in place specifically to serve the public’s rights.168 The 
rationales behind such a radical doctrine thus inevitably shed light on the 
allegedly vital principles the law aims to achieve by creating public rights. 
The public trust doctrine’s dramatic choice to single out certain 
properties as necessarily public has been ascribed to several factors. Some 
commentators view the doctrine as expressing the notion that certain 
properties—navigable waters, for example—are particularly important and 
thus cannot be put to a private use.169 A nuanced version of this argument 
explains that these properties are so intrinsically vital for a citizen’s well-
being that, by its very nature, a free society mandates their availability to 
each and every citizen.170 Other writers opine that the doctrine gives voice 
to a healthy skepticism respecting governmental actions that shift certain 
properties from one use to another. 171  Another scholar notes that the 
doctrine identifies spaces that are “most valuable when used by indefinite 
and unlimited numbers” of people, especially those spaces necessary for 
commerce, an activity bringing forth infinite returns to expanding 
participation.172 
One core thread runs through all these different accounts. If certain 
properties are of particular importance, if they are necessary for a free 
society, if governmental decisions to reallocate them are prone to be 
dubious, if they are put to their most beneficial use when shared, it is only 
because those properties have a core, innate, and almost natural use to which 
they must be dedicated. Otherwise, any claim that they have a uniquely 
important function would be incoherent. 
This core assumption that aids, as suggested here, in explaining the 
public trust doctrine’s normative underpinnings is apparent when reviewing 
the doctrine’s historical development. Judges originally focused the 
doctrine on waterways since they viewed these as subject to a specific, 
innate—indeed, literally natural—use: navigation and fishing.173 Bodies of 
water were naturally created, and humans put them to those specific uses 
inherent to their nature. Thus, courts could intuitively—and plausibly—
 
167. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 155, at 800 (“The public trust doctrine[ is] a jarring exception 
of uncertain dimensions . . . .”). 
168. Id. 
169. Sax, supra note 159, at 484–85. 
170. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 414 (1842). 
171. Sax, supra note 159, at 490. 
172. Rose, supra note 34, at 774. 













hold that these spaces were never intended to be put to any other use. Courts 
could then proceed to conclude that government was barred not only from 
turning these spaces private, but also from interfering in any other way with 
their “natural” uses.174  
For this same reason, modern courts have been reluctant to expand the 
number of properties covered by the public trust doctrine to spaces that, 
unlike navigable waters, might not have a limited and clear natural use;175 
or to expand the uses of properties protected by the doctrine to include 
recreation, which unlike fishing and navigation, might not so easily be 
deemed a natural or innate use of navigable waters.176 At the heart of the 
public trust doctrine, therefore, is the principle that the uses which are made 
of certain specific public properties must be related to certain natural uses 
that are peculiar to those properties.177  
This logic is, as noted, perhaps easiest to grasp in the context of the 
public trust doctrine because the uses of space that the doctrine targets could 
always be imagined as dictated literally by nature. But the idea’s pertinence 
does not hinge on a given public space’s being a natural resource. The 
rationale that certain properties have specific inherent public uses can, and 
does, similarly set the contours of public rights created by the other 
acquisition doctrines reviewed in Part I, doctrines that are not limited in 
their application to natural resources.  
Dedication law provides an illustration. As seen, the individual granting 
the space to the public defines the dedication’s terms: the rights granted to 
the public, their breadth, and goals. 178  If the dedicator remains silent, 
however, courts have held that the public gains the right to use the dedicated 
property to the full extent to which that type of property would be commonly 
used.179 The natural, or intrinsic, use of the dedicated public space thus 
serves as a default.  
 
174. See supra notes 144–145. 
175. See supra notes 144–145. 
176. See SINGER, supra note 22, at 89 (discussing most courts’ decision to not include recreation 
among the public uses that must be allowed under the doctrine).  
177. Sax, supra note 159, at 477. 
178. See supra notes 109–116 and accompanying text. 
179. Harvey v. Bell, 732 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Ark. 1987) (holding that since owner dedicated sewage 
line to the public she cannot object to a neighbor’s hookup to that line as that is the natural use of such 
dedicated property); 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 77 (1956) (“Unless there are reservations, the general 
public . . . has the right to use dedicated property to the full extent to which such easements are 
commonly used.”); Biglin v. Town of W. Orange, 217 A.2d 135, 138 (N.J. 1966) (holding that a pool 
can be built on land dedicated as a recreational field since pools are normally understood as fully 
consistent with recreational uses).  












It does still more. The dedicated space’s intrinsic use can even void a 
condition in a dedication that patently contradicts that intrinsic use. 180 
Courts have insisted that while the dedicator can make reservations to her 
dedication—limiting future public uses or keeping in herself certain use 
rights over the dedicated space—these reservations must not prohibit 
specific public uses commonly understood as inevitable in that space.181 If 
they do, the reservations are held void as contradicting the purpose of the 
dedication.182 The condition cannot be “inconsistent with or repugnant to 
the gift.” 183  Thus, for example, courts have repeatedly clarified that a 
dedication of a highway cannot contain a limitation on the public’s right to 
travel there or on current or future functions—such as lighting or drainage—
that are assumed to form an inherent and inevitable outgrowth of that 
intrinsic use.184  
The guiding principle that certain public properties—but not other public 
properties—have a natural or intrinsic use is also responsible for the basic 
architecture of the rules for acquiring public rights through the passage of 
time. As Part I noted, the common law did not allow the public at large to 
acquire fee interests through the passage of time (via adverse possession) 
but did allow for the acquisition of easements in such a manner (via 
prescription). The difference was genereated by the doctrines’ diverging 
attitudes towards an exclusivity requirement. A successful adverse 
possession claim requires exclusive possession by the claimant—a 
requirement that the general public, which by definition is non-exclusive, 
 
180. Lynchburg Traction & Light Co. v. City of Lynchburg, 128 S.E. 606, 609 (Va. 1925) (“[T]he 
donor may annex [to a dedication of a highway] any restriction or condition he pleases, not inconsistent 
with or repugnant to the gift.” (emphasis added)). 
181. 4 TIFFANY, supra note 99, § 1111 (“But the dedication of property for the purpose of a 
highway carries the right to public travel and also to the use for all present and future agencies commonly 
adopted by public authority for the benefit of the people, such as sewer, water, gas, lighting, and 
telephone systems, and a condition in a deed of dedication prohibiting such uses or circumscribing the 
future freedom of action of the authorities to devote the street to the wants and convenience of the public 
is void as against public policy or as inconsistent with the grant; and this is also true of a condition 
against any grant of a right or franchise to use the street for street railway purposes.” (footnote omitted)). 
182. Vill. of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 235 N.W. 829, 832 (Mich. 1931) (“A condition in a 
deed of dedication prohibiting the uses above stated or circumscribing the future freedom of action of 
the authorities to devote the street to the wants and convenience of the public is void, as against public 
policy or as inconsistent with the grant.”); City of Camdenton v. Sho-Me Power Corp., 237 S.W.2d 94, 
98–99 (Mo. 1951) (holding that a city could not abide by a reservation to a dedication of a street 
preserving in the grantors the right to locate, build, maintain, and operate sewer, telephone, light and 
power lines, water mains, outlets, and connections for them along, through, or under certain roads). 
183. Lynchburg Traction & Light Co., 128 S.E. at 609.  
184. Timberlake Plantation Co. v. Cty. of Lexington, 431 S.E.2d 573, 575 (S.C. 1993); Ayres, 235 













cannot satisfy.185 Conversely, in the common law, a successful prescriptive 
easement claim generally need not meet the exclusivity requirement.186  
The seemingly technical distinction in doctrinal requirements was 
actually grounded in the distinct nature of the rights. The logic generating 
the exclusivity requirement in one doctrine but not the other is that a fee 
interest, given its nature, cannot be shared, while a right of way, given its 
nature, can. To illustrate: two strangers cannot easily live in the same house 
but they can easily drive on the same road.187  
The difference in the nature of the pertinent spaces is responsible for the 
doctrinal distinction. That distinction then produces clear and important 
consequences for the realm of public rights’ acquisition. Thus, for example, 
highways are perceived as naturally suitable for passage by the public, and 
hence the law deems them—but not other spaces—as potential targets for 
public rights’ acquisition through the passage of time.188  
The law’s emphasis on the notion that certain public rights have specific 
uses that are inherent to them, discerned in the acquisition doctrines 
reviewed so far in this Section, has also impacted the law governing the 
other mode of acquiring public rights: government action. The Supreme 
Court’s eminent domain jurisprudence, allowing the government to 
condemn property for diverse uses, has always been justified by the claim 
that the property the government takes has no one specific, inescapable, 
public use.189 Thus, the government is free, according to existing doctrine, 
to employ confiscated property for economic development purposes—not 
just for traditional public uses—and to collaborate in so doing with private 
entities.190 Had the Court ever been persuaded that the public rights the 
Constitution imagined as created via eminent domain must have specific, 
innate uses, it would have had to step in to define the specific and limited 
public uses to which government must employ confiscated properties.191 
Yet the Court has explicitly, and consistently, refused to do so.192  
The conviction that some public spaces do not have only one particular 
use that is inherent to them, and that therefore government enjoys freedom 
to delineate the uses of those public spaces, has impacted another field of 
constitutional law. Courts have heavily relied on this idea when issuing First 
 
185. SINGER, supra note 22, at 148. At a minimum exclusivity requires excluding the title owner, 
but since the owner is a member of the public a use by the public does not exclude her. 
186. Id. at 204. 
187. Id. 
188. 4 TIFFANY, supra note 99, § 1211. 
189. See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text. 
190. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954). 
191. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 514 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
192. See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text. 












Amendment rulings.193 While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence setting the 
government’s power to limit freedom of speech rights in public spaces is 
famously muddled—generating closely contested decisions and a 
seemingly endless stream of disputes in the lower courts194—one clear 
animating notion can be found pervading it. The Court has been rather 
consistent in its statements to the effect that a public space must always be 
kept open to speech only if it is the type of space whose natural character 
invites and accommodates free public expression.195  
In accordance, the Court has held that only some government-owned 
properties are to be recognized as “quintessential public forums” which 
must be open to any member of the public seeking to exercise her free 
expression rights. 196  Other public properties are not subject to such 
constitutional regulation. Different approaches have been suggested to 
ascertain whether a given public space is, in its very nature, a public forum, 
and thus inherently susceptible to free speech: the place’s traditional use,197 
its objective character,198 its physical similarity to places dedicated to a 
certain use,199 public expectations,200 and more. But in one way or another, 
the notion that certain public places are naturally or inherently 
accommodating for a specific activity—here, speech—while others are not, 
has guided decisions in the field.201 It has led courts to distinguish, for 
example, highway rest-stops, 202  airport terminals, 203  and public transit 
vehicles,204 from sidewalks. The latter are spaces where speech is a natural 
activity and hence must be allowed under the Constitution, whereas the 
former, so courts hold, are not. Courts further hold that once a public space, 
such as the sidewalk, has such a natural function, the government cannot 
 
193. For an overview of key rulings, their background, and reasoning, see Robert C. Post, Between 
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 
(1987). 
194. Gey, supra note 36, at 1555 (“The . . . public forum doctrine may not be the most fractured 
area in modern constitutional law, but it comes close.”). 
195. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650–51 (1981) 
(explaining that each public space will be judged in accordance with its “special attributes,” especially 
the “nature and function of the particular forum involved”). 
196. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
197. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992). 
198. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737–38 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
199. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 698–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
200. See Edward J. Neveril, "Objective" Approaches to the Public Forum Doctrine: The First 
Amendment at the Mercy of Architectural Chicanery, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1185, 1212 (1996). 
201. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (“The crucial question is whether the 
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place . . . .”). 
202. Sentinel Commc’ns Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 1991). 
203. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672. 














take away that function by simply passing a law purporting to render that 
space closed or to transfer it to a private entity.205 
First Amendment jurisprudence, which, as noted at Part I’s outset, is 
perhaps the most salient legal battlefield for the struggle to define and 
govern public spaces, thus illustrates the degree to which the normative 
principle whereby some—but not other—public spaces have one specific 
use that is innate, defined, and inevitable, permeates the law of public 
spaces. 
B. Picking the Public in Light of the Law’s Normative Theme 
The concerns the doctrines that are responsible for public rights’ creation 
give voice to inevitably embody the core normative priorities of the law of 
public spaces. These concerns should thus inform the legal approach 
determining who holds public rights in those spaces once they are created, 
and, accordingly, how disputes surrounding these rights are to be settled. 
These normative concerns should, that is, dictate the answer to the question 
this Article poses: who should “the public” be in any given public space? 
The key principle the preceding Section discerned among the concerns 
molding the doctrines that regulate the acquisition of public rights was that 
some public spaces, but not others, have a specific, innate public use. That 
insight will accordingly now be translated into an operative test that can 
identify, in a given case, the public that is to be adjudged the holder of an 
existing public right.  
The typical dispute over the uses of a public space materializes, as seen 
in the Introduction, when a new use of the space is launched. A court that 
must then resolve a challenge to a government policy respecting that new 
or changed use (a policy introducing the use, allowing it, or banning it) 
should employ a two-step test. The first step of the proposed test is rather 
straightforward, given the preceding normative discussion: a court must 
ascertain whether the given public space has one specific use that is inherent 
to it. As the Supreme Court’s holdings in the eminent domain cases clarify, 
no grounds can be found to interfere with a government’s decision 
respecting a specific public property if that specific property does not have 
a natural, or innate, use.206 
Unless such a use can be identified, why should political processes be 
upended? In the absence of an objective metric that an innate use can 
provide for assessing the government’s decision, the democratically elected 
 
205. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 548 S.E.2d 249, 254 (Va. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d in part, 563 S.E.2d 
674 (Va. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003). 
206. See supra notes 189–194 and accompanying text. 












government’s judgment should not be second-guessed.207 If no independent 
criterion exists, neither the courts, nor the public at large, nor any individual, 
can be assumed to hold better insight into the optimal use of the public right 
than that which the local government has. The government is the public’s 
elected representative and thus enjoys democratic legitimacy that the other 
entities lack.208 For this reason it should be the default decision-maker for 
the public. This is, after all, the general attitude of American constitutional 
law: courts only substantively assess the decisions of a democratically 
elected government if there is some clear, predetermined standard those 
decisions could be said to breach.209  
This constitutional theory is already embedded in the law of public 
spaces. As seen earlier, the law only interferes with the government’s 
freedom of action when creating public rights—insisting that some such 
rights are held by the government in trust and must remain public, or that a 
certain condition appended to a dedication the government accepts be 
ignored—if the relevant right is such that it must be put, given its nature and 
character, to a specific use.210  
The same should apply when the law considers the management of a 
public right once it is created. In determining the uses of public assets the 
government should not be replaced in its typical role as the public’s 
representative  when the asset at-hand cannot be said to have some specific 
innate use from which no rational deviation is imaginable. If the public right 
has no specific use to which it must be put, the “public” holding and 
managing it should, that is, be the democratically elected local government.  
If, on the other hand, the relevant public space does have one specific 
use that is natural, inherent, or innate to it, limits on the local government’s 
decision-making powers can be justified—and a court has objective grounds 
for interfering. The court is in possession of a benchmark against which to 
evaluate the government’s decision: the court should protect the space’s 
inherent use. Specifically, it must, in such cases, decide how much leeway 
to grant the government in interpreting the innate use, or in adjusting that 
 
207. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005) (criticizing and overruling 
an older test for assessing a governmental taking that required judicial approval of the goals of a 
property’s regulation, because it “would empower—and might often require—courts to substitute their 
predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies”). 
208. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 
(1980). 
209. Under traditional living constitution notions, the court should interfere in specific cases 
identified as involving the failure of the political process. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938). Under originalism, a court must intervene when a statute contradicts a specific 
clause of the Constitution, as understood by the drafters. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 584 (2008). 













use to new conditions. This second step of the legal analysis (relevant only 
in cases where a natural use can be identified for the space) should, like the 
first step, be designed in light of the overall normative concern animating 
this field of law. That concern—with the specific intrinsic uses associated 
with certain public rights—can generate at least three factors relevant for 
determining the expanse of the government’s discretion in managing 
properties that have one specific public use that is intrinsic to them. 
One inevitable factor is the breadth of the specific innate use of the 
contested public right. Not all uses (innate or not) are created equal. Some 
are rather narrow (say, fishing) while others are wide or somewhat opaque 
(say, recreation). The latter inevitably can be subject to more than one 
reasonable interpretation (recreation may or may not include camping, for 
example). The more flexible and open to contending readings the specific 
use that is intrinsic to the public space, the more hesitant the court should 
be before intervening. As noted, the space’s inherent use serves as the basis 
for judicial intervention in the management of the underlying public right. 
Hence if that use is rather unclear, the court lacks clear grounds for 
aggressively intervening in the democratic process. This suggested 
approach is an outgrowth of American law’s general attitude. Cases where 
there is more than one legitimate public decision to be made are the 
quintessential instances where a court accords a realm of reasonableness 
within which a democratically elected government can act freely. 211 
Conversely, courts are much more willing to step in, and assess the wisdom 
of the government’s action, when the applicable legal order leaves little 
room for multiple readings.212 Accordingly, in disputes over public spaces, 
courts should employ common law strictures to embody the public in 
interpreting the relevant public right’s intrinsic or natural use when that use 
is narrow and well-defined.  
The second factor for this stage of the analysis has to do with costs. A 
court should be willing to expand the discretion allowed the government in 
interpreting a public space’s seemingly inevitable use when the government 
actually pays the price of sustaining the public space. Public spaces are not 
costless. Like any other space, they must be maintained and at times 
repaired.213 The maintenance and repair costs of certain public spaces can 
be rather substantial. Furthermore, the costs of maintaining some public 
 
211. The famous case announcing this approach is West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 
391, 393 (1937). 
212. An example is found in the treatment of government action in torts law. Government often 
enjoys tort immunity when its acts involve an element of discretion and choice, United States v. Gaubert, 
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directive.” Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
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spaces can fall squarely and almost fully on the government alone.214 The 
legal doctrines reviewed in Part I acknowledge, and account for, this fact. 
For example, the law of dedication mandates that a government accept—or 
agree to the acceptance of—a dedication.215 Courts added this requirement 
due to the worry that individual dedicators or specific members of the public 
desiring to accept a dedication will saddle the government with the costs of 
maintaining a space that serves them—but not the rest of the public.216 They 
will in this fashion offload on the public the costs of maintaining a space 
that while technically public, is of particular private benefit to them alone.217 
This concern is born of the overall theme this Part detected throughout the 
law of public spaces: not all public spaces have an inherent use beneficial 
to all public members.  
The concern respecting the government’s need to carry a space’s 
maintenance costs is present when a new use of the public right in that space, 
or a suggestion to reinterpret its existing intrinsic uses, is introduced. New 
uses of the space might increase the costs of maintaining the public space. 
Therefore, if the government is destined to bear the brunt of those costs it 
should be afforded more of a say in determining whether the new uses are 
to be allowed. As the entity actually footing the bill for the public right, it 
should be considered the relevant “public” for that right and hold more 
power over it.  
Conversely, if the government does little to finance the maintenance of 
a public space that has an inherent use, its position should not be prioritized. 
If the public space is of the sort that requires little by way of maintenance, 
the public at large, rather than the government, might be the right entity to 
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hold decision-making powers over the space. 218  The “public” for such 
public spaces should thus be the public at large. Similarly, if the public space 
is of the sort that is mostly maintained by specific individuals—adjoining 
owners (as might sometimes be the case with beach properties) or the 
original dedicator (as when a dedicator commits not only land to the public 
but also funds for its maintenance)—those individuals might be the best 
situated to make determinations respecting the public space’s 
management.219 For such public spaces, specific individuals might be the 
most appropriate “public” deemed the holder of the public right.220  
Another, third and final, factor should affect the choice of a “public” for 
a public right that has a specific use innate to it. An inevitable consideration 
demarcating the latitude awarded a government in its handling of public 
resources is that government’s trustworthiness. A dose of skepticism 
towards the government’s asserted good intentions—the suspicion that in a 
given case it is not acting to promote the public good, but rather the good of 
a specific, well-positioned private group—permeates much of the law of 
public spaces.221 Many courts have interpreted the public trust doctrine in 
this vein.222 They have been much more willing to fall back on the public 
trust doctrine in circumstances where the risk of government corruption in 
the handling of the relevant public assets is elevated.223 Similarly, in its most 
recent eminent domain decision, the Supreme Court stressed that any use of 
that governmental power to acquire property must be thoroughly scrutinized 
to verify that the government is not covertly acting on behalf of some private 
or corporate interest.224  Government must therefore, the Court insisted, 
 
218. See 11A MCQUILLIN, supra note 132, § 33.45 (discussing the opposite scenario, where “the 
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show that the governmental taking of property is done in the context of a 
broader public plan.225 Otherwise, the Court instructed, a reviewing court 
should suspect that the confiscation is a mere transfer of an asset from one 
private party to another private party—with only the pretext of a public 
interest.226  
This suspicion of the government’s motives reflects the core normative 
theme of public spaces law reviewed throughout this Part. The more 
inescapable the public use of a certain space, the more government ought to 
be mistrusted if it attempts to transfer that space to a private user.227 If the 
current use of the public property is (allegedly) inescapable, a heightened 
burden of proof should be placed on the government trying to, in essence, 
escape that use. An identification of an asset with an inherent use conveys 
a notion of permanence, while elected officials, even if not corrupt, 
sometimes only consider short-term returns. The court, which, unlike 
elected officials, has a long time horizon, can assure stability and adherence 
to a supposedly stable intrinsic use.228 
Misgivings about the government’s motivations should, therefore, 
inform courts’ identification of the holder of powers over a public space that 
has certain intrinsic uses. In cases of particular risk of dubious governmental 
behavior, courts should refrain from identifying the government as the 
public’s representative. Specifically, if there are distinct private 
beneficiaries to a governmental decision respecting a given public space, a 
court should be willing to meaningfully review the government’s decision 
and interject on behalf of the public at large. Situations in which abutting 
owners stand to derive a disproportionate benefit from a public space (or 
from a specific activity allowed or disallowed therein) serve as examples. 
So do cases where private infrastructure, serving a specific corporate entity 
and not the general public, is allowed on the public space free of charge. In 
such and similar circumstances, courts should mistrust the government. To 
protect the public’s specific natural use of the space, they should define the 
“public” holding the relevant public rights in these cases as the public at 
large. 
In sum, this Section’s analysis suggests that in light of the normative 
theme reigning over the law of public spaces, a two-step test is necessary 
for ascertaining who the public holding a given public right should be. A 
 
225. A similar requirement is sometimes applied when government agencies make decisions 
respecting public trust assets. E.g., State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957). 
226. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. 
227. Sax, supra note 159, at 565. 
228. On the courts’ long time horizon, see, for example, Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative 
Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 













court should commence by determining whether the given public right has 
one use that is inherent, natural, or intrinsic to it. If it does not, the 
democratically elected local government should be deemed the “public.” If 
the right does have a natural use, the court should proceed to the next step, 
where it should consider three factors. First, the breadth of the space’s 
intrinsic use: the narrower that use, the more willing the court should be to 
reject the identification of the government with the “public” and to resort to 
common law strictures in determining the public space’s uses. Second, the 
identity of the entity bearing the costs of maintaining the public right: if 
those costs are substantial then either the government or individual 
owners—whichever of the two shoulders those costs—should have a strong 
claim to be the public holding the public right. Third, the degree of faith in 
government decision-making: if low, then the public at large should be 
adjudged the public holding the public right. 
A final clarifying comment respecting the test developed in this Part of 
the Article is in order before we turn to actually applying it. The test heavily 
relies—almost solely relies—on the notion that certain uses of public spaces 
are innate or natural. As noted earlier, this notion does not assume that 
certain uses are dictated by “nature.” The identification of a use as intrinsic, 
inherent, or innate is itself intrinsically, inherently, and innately social and 
cultural. A use is inescapable only given a specific set of social or legal 
precepts that govern at a given time or place. Thus nothing bars an innate 
use from changing over time, and from some individuals contesting the 
alleged innateness (or indeed, incontestablility) of that use. Still, even with 
these caveats, many times a use perceived by society as innate to a space, 
one that the vast majority of observers view as uncontestable, can be 
identified—as the examples the next Part discusses show. Such common 
perceptions, although there is nothing natural to them, should be given legal 
weight. 
III. WHO SHOULD THE PUBLIC BE: EXAMPLES 
The test just suggested for identifying the “public” in a given public 
space is in line with the normative concerns of the existing laws of public 
spaces. But is it also effective in solving real world legal problems? This 
final Part of the Article aims to show that it is. The Part uses the framework 
developed in Part II to analyze the two disputes reviewed in the 
Introduction, respecting the Obama Presidential Center and the electric 
scooters. Through that exercise, it also clarifies more generally the legal 












standing of two of the most important public spaces we have: parks and 
sidewalks. 
A. The Public in Parks 
The park is a quintessential public space, and the public’s right in most 
parks is of the fee type.229 The public owns the park.230 But who is that 
“public” owning the park? As noted earlier, that is precisely the question 
the federal court must decide as it contemplates the dispute surrounding the 
Obama Presidential Center. In contending that the Center cannot be built on 
publicly owned parkland, the plaintiffs argue that the “public” controlling 
the land and determining what uses can be made of the rights therein is not 
the city—which has approved the project—but rather the strictures of the 
common law.231  
To settle such a dispute—to identify the “public” relevant here: the city 
or a set of common law rules—we must first ask, in light of the framework 
developed in Part II, whether the contested public space has one specific use 
that is inherent to it. This Section will review, in order, first the ever-
changing societal views respecting the role of parks, then the character of 
the debates that typically engulf the choice of park functions, and finally 
judicial decisions dealing with parks. Based on all of these it will conclude 
that the answer to that question is no. Hence the democratically elected local 
government should be deemed the public holding the public rights in the 
park. 
The history of parks in America illustrates just how diverse societal 
views respecting the role and potential uses of parks have always been. The 
modern idea of the park emerged in the nineteenth century. Before, to the 
extent open spaces that were not privately owned existed in the midst of 
human settlements, such spaces consisted of grazing areas open to all.232 
Perhaps the most famous example for this kind of park space is the Boston 
 
229. Sarah Schindler, The “Publicization” of Private Space, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2018) 
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San Francisco’s Golden Gate Park . . . .”). 
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government involvement with such parks might be relevant in other contexts. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 
382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (holding that the existence of a segregated park that benefitted from city 
involvement was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment because the mere transfer of title 
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Common—the “first public park in the United States”—which was used by 
locals as a cows’ pasture for two hundred years starting with colonization 
in the 1630s.233  
Thereafter the nature of that park and others changed. In the mid-
nineteenth century, as industrialization, mass immigration, and urbanization 
began changing the American landscape, many artists, policy-makers, and 
reformers were harkening back to the old rural days.234 They thus introduced 
the concept of the city park as an antidote to the era’s urban realities.235 The 
park they imagined was an attempt to recreate a pastoral idyll. Hence, it was 
to be used for quiet contemplation of nature.236 New York City’s Central 
Park, designed by Olmsted and Vaux in 1858, embodied that idea: the park 
contained meadows and winding paths, natural components such as rocks 
and trees (none of them indigenous), and was intentionally rendered 
inhospitable to active pursuits.237  
Soon enough though, by the turn of the twentieth century, that notion of 
the park—as a locus for passive appreciation of nature—was losing 
steam.238 In the Progressive Era, social reformers and planners, drawing on 
the new academic fields of sociology, psychology, and anthropology, and 
on advances in the health studies,239 began arguing that parks should provide 
urban dwellers with opportunities to exercise and engage in sporting 
activities. 240  The proliferation of playgrounds, the addition of baseball 
diamonds, swimming-pools, and other such amenities to major parks—
including to Central Park as reimagined by the uber-planner Robert 
Moses—reflected these new ideas respecting the optimal uses of parks.241  
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237. ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 232, at 131 (explaining that the design of Central 
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Later still, as the postwar decades were marred by suburbanization, racial 
and economic segregation, and social alienation, scholars began advocating 
for the role of parks as spaces for interaction between strangers—interaction 
between people of different backgrounds.242 In the past two decades, similar 
emphasis has been put on parks’ capacity to allow varied constituencies to 
experience art.243  
Summarizing some of these observations, one prominent history of the 
park movement in the United States offers a useful typology identifying at 
least four distinct eras, each with its own view of the public park’s role. 
When the modern park emerged in 1850 it was first imagined as the 
“pleasure ground.”244 Then in 1900 a shift occurred to the “reform park” 
idea which ruled through 1930,245 when it was displaced by the “recreation 
facility” view. 246  By 1965 the “open-space system” came to dominate 
American parks.247 
The many sharply distinct visions for parks that kept (and keep) 248 
replacing each other in quick succession throughout American history refute 
the notion that parks have only one use that is intrinsic to their nature.249 
The idea is further belied by the public controversies that have materialized 
over the years respecting parks’ uses. Should alcohol be consumed in a 
park? 250  Should vehicles enter? 251  Should recreational facilities be 
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constructed?252 Should food establishments be made available?253 Should 
political and ethnic groups erect monuments commemorating their 
heroes?254 Should music festivals take over for a weekend?255 Should a 
portion of the park be converted into a dog-friendly park? 256  These 
questions illustrate not only the range of uses to which parks might be put, 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, the absence of any objective metric 
that can be used to pick among such potential uses. As one designer notes, 
the “uncertainty about the meaning of parks”257 entails the reality that “in 
contemporary practice the word ‘park’ [is] applie[d] to an almost 
indiscriminate range of properties.”258 The potential questions respecting 
the proper uses of this wide range of properties are political, economic, or 
social in nature. They form precisely the type of questions that are for the 
relevant community to settle through the political process.259  
And indeed, when courts have been forced to intervene in social disputes 
over park uses, they have largely refused to set any sort of clear-cut legal 
benchmark for what is a park use. Courts have had to contend with the 
problem of defining park uses in cases where a specific statute or a specific 
act of dedication created a park and mandated that that park only be put to 
“park uses.” When a city attempted to introduce a new use into the park, a 
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court had to decide whether that new use qualified as “a park use.” In such 
circumstances, courts have almost universally interpreted the phrases “park 
use” or “park purpose” broadly to encompass practically any use.  
A few examples illustrate. The Pennsylvania court approved the 
construction, in a park, of a little league baseball field,260 of a golf course,261 
and of an auditorium for entertainment events charging admission fees;262 
the New Jersey court a clubhouse and concessions for tennis, bicycling, and 
boating;263  the California court a library264  and a parking garage;265  the 
Illinois court a pool;266and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
the leasing of floating homes and lakefront cottages. 267  The New York 
court, sanctioning the opening of a private restaurant in a space dedicated to 
park uses alone, explicitly eschewed the use of any standard—even a 
“flexible standard”—for determining what uses count as park uses. 268 
While, the court explained, in light of a specific state statute, “it is for the 
courts to determine what is and is not a park purpose . . . the [relevant local 
government body] enjoys broad discretion to choose among alternative 
valid park purposes.”269 That court also explained elsewhere that since a 
park’s potential uses are so plentiful, a “mere difference of opinion” as to 
“proper and appropriate utilization” will never suffice to overturn the 
government’s decision. 270  The New Jersey court simply concluded that 
parks are a broad category that “may be thought of as a combination of open 
space, facilities for physical activities and accommodations for other 
recreation and entertainment[,] and playgrounds” and hence courts are 
willing “to approve a wide variety of uses as within [a park’s] dedicated 
purpose.”271  This conclusion clearly reflects the general attitude among 
courts. Courts have consistently refused to pinpoint one specific use as the 
inevitable park use. 
Throughout American urban history, societal and professional visions 
for the design and uses of parks have been subject to constant change; the 
disputes over proper park uses have always been unamenable to objective, 
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as opposed to policy-driven, sorting; and courts have repeatedly refused to 
identify any set of preordained and mandatory park uses. The “strictest” 
definition of a park that the law can provide is “a piece of ground inclosed 
for purposes of pleasure, exercise, amusement or ornament.”272 A place 
whose functions are so open-ended cannot be said to have a single innate or 
intrinsic use. “The functions that parks have aimed to fulfill are not natural 
or inevitable.”273 Thus, the democratically elected government should be 
allowed to pick among the wide array of uses that might be made of a park. 
Such a government can accordingly opt to have a Presidential Center there, 
and that choice cannot be impeded on any principled grounds. In light of the 
test this Article developed, in that specific case and in the case of parks in 
general, the relevant “public” holding the public rights should be the local 
government.274 
B. The Public on the Sidewalk 
Alongside the case of the Presidential Center, the Introduction presented 
a second example of a new use launched into an existing public space: 
electric scooters on sidewalks. Like the park, and perhaps even more so, the 
sidewalk is a central and well-established public space. Sidewalks are 
among the most commonplace public spaces.275 The public often holds a fee 
 
272. Perrin v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 36 N.Y. 120, 124 (1867). 
273. CRANZ, supra note 257, at 239. 
274. Throughout this discussion, I assumed that the relevant government making decisions 
respecting the park is the local, rather than state, government. That assumption is grounded in the 
common practices of American states. Thus, for example, the Chicago Park District is authorized, under 
statute, to control Jackson Park. See supra note 2. Furthermore, the state legislature has specifically 
empowered it to erect and operate a presidential center. 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1290/1 (West 2017). 
Nonetheless, since in American law the local government is a creature of the state, Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907), the state can, by statute, preempt any local decision. Under 
very specific circumstances, decisions respecting parks might be shielded from such intervention. In 
some states, local governments might enjoy home rule immunity shielding decisions about their parks 
from state intervention, if these decisions are found to be “purely local.” See generally Nadav Shoked, 
Cities Taxing New Sins: The Judicial Embrace of Local Excise Taxation, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 822–23 
(2018). Additionally, certain decisions respecting some city parks might be deemed proprietary, rather 
than governmental, and such decisions are similarly protected. See Bd. of Comm’rs v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 
108, 115 (1876). Arguably, there are good reasons to prefer city, over state, action in this specific field—
given how “local” a park is. But both these doctrinal and normative questions are beyond the scope of 
this Article. The question here was whether the government—any government—should hold the power 
over the public space. The choice was not between governments, but between government, the public at 
large, individual owners, or the court. For these purposes, the specific identity of the democratically 
elected government matters little.  
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interest in them, and if not, an easement.276 Because it is such a prevalent 
space, disputes surrounding the management of public rights on the 
sidewalk are prone to arise, especially when new uses are introduced, as 
with the electric scooters. In such instances, the power of the government to 
regulate—or itself introduce—those new uses is challenged. These disputes 
thus press in stark fashion the question of who is the “public” holding the 
public rights on sidewalks. Part II suggested that this question be answered 
through a two-pronged test. As will be seen now, unlike with parks, the task 
of identifying the public holding the public rights in sidewalks involves both 
steps of the analysis—since sidewalks, unlike parks, do have an intrinsic 
use. 
Sidewalks are a space that most people would intuitively associate with 
at least one innate, indeed inevitable, use: pedestrian movement. One 
example for this common intuition was provided very recently. Residents 
of a major city began complaining that delivery companies block passage 
on the sidewalk when using it to sort packages, the numbers of which have 
been soaring given the proliferation of online shopping. 277  But this 
association of the sidewalk with pedestrian movement is anything but new. 
It has characterized sidewalks throughout their existence. As will be seen 
now, that association can easily be discerned in the sidewalk’s history, is 
apparent in the elements of the law of public spaces reviewed in Part I 
pertinent to the sidewalk, and finally has manifested itself in recent federal 
court decisions.  
The first comprehensive law authorizing the paving of sidewalks 
throughout a city was passed by the British Parliament in 1766.278  The 
London Paving and Lighting Act279 was a response to the disorder of the 
then-existing system, where each owner was responsible for the paving and 
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maintenance of the portion of the street fronting his property.280 The result 
was different paving materials and patterns along the same sidewalk and no 
separation between the sidewalk and the road where horses and horse-drawn 
vehicles traversed. 281  Consequently, movement on the sidewalk was 
challenging—and indeed dangerous—for pedestrians.282 The Paving Act’s 
goal was to remedy the situation: to facilitate pedestrian movement by 
assuring uniformity.283 The Act thus authorized the City of London to create 
footways throughout the city’s streets, to pave them with Purbeck stone (the 
thoroughfare in the middle was generally cobblestone), and to raise them 
above the street level with curbs.284 A century later, and across the ocean, 
when American municipalities began providing sidewalks in the late 
nineteenth century, they entertained the same motivation: “one use, walking 
for transportation, became the primary purpose for which the sidewalks 
were constructed. . . . [T]he pedestrian became the public for whom the 
sidewalks were being provided.”285  
The common law as it developed ever since these original English and 
American paving acts has similarly subscribed to the idea that sidewalks are 
devoted to free pedestrian movement.286 As noted in Part II, land dedicated 
for a sidewalk cannot be made subject to a reservation by the dedicator—
despite the latter’s normal freedom of contract—that would limit public 
passage.287 Such a limitation is deemed inconsistent with the purpose of the 
dedication or against public policy.288 A limit on pedestrian movement on 
the sidewalk, the common law thus believes, goes against the nature of the 
sidewalk as a public space.289 Another reflection of this idea is found in the 
law of prescriptive easements: such easements are created through 
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288. Vill. of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 235 N.W. 829, 832 (Mich. 1931). 
289. Elizabeth City v. Banks, 64 S.E. 189 (N.C. 1909). 












continued public passage on a space, as noted, and can terminate if the 
public ceases to pass through the space.290 The law assumes that the public 
easement has one core use—public movement—and once that use 
disappears, the easement might be adjudged abandoned with it.291 
The common law’s deep committment to this position, revealed in both 
the dedication and prescriptive easement doctrines, whereby sidewalks are 
meant for walking, affected other elements of the law as well, including 
trespass. Courts would hold that a person who stopped on the sidewalk in 
front of a man’s house and addressed that man abusively was committing 
trespass—although the speaker stayed on the public sidewalk. Such a person 
was held to be diverging from the natural use of the pertinent public space—
walking through it.292  Courts similarly authorized any person who was 
seeking to use a given road for passage to remove obstructions others had 
placed there.293 
The common law’s devotion to the view of sidewalks as inherently and 
inescapably dedicated to walking might now even form part of American 
constitutional law. Federal courts have always held that this inherent role of 
the sidewalk could justify the placement of limits on constitutional rights. 
Thus courts have consistently ruled that the sidewalk’s natural function of 
facilitating pedestrian movement could justify time, place, and manner 
restrictions on the exercise of otherwise constitutionally protected rights of 
protest.294 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2019 that an 
1892 statute pronouncing it illegal to “crowd, obstruct, or incommode” the 
sidewalk was not unconstitutionally vague, despite the clearly opaque 
standards it established, given the prohibition’s purpose, which easily 
aligned with the “common sense” goal of protecting the “prerogative[]” of 
the public to “walk” on the sidewalk.295  
At least one federal court has been willing to go further still, and endow 
the function of the sidewalk as a space for walking with the imprimatur of 
a constitutional right. In a recent decision, the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals struck down Memphis’s policy of preventing all persons from 
walking on the sidewalks of Beale Street—the city’s main entertainment 
 
290. 3 TIFFANY, supra note 99, § 930. 
291. Normally, abandonment also requires a subjective intent to vacate the right, but prolonged 
nonuse can serve as evidence for such intent. Some courts hold that an easement acquired by prescription 
can be lost by nonuse alone—an intent to abandon need not be shown. See, e.g., People v. Ocean Shore 
R.R., 196 P.2d 570, 579 (Cal. 1948). 
292. Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851). 
293. Inhabitants of Arundel v. M’Culloch, 10 Mass. (10 Tyng) 70 (1813). 
294. See Pomicter v. Luzerne Cty. Convention Ctr. Auth., 939 F.3d 534, 544 (3d Cir. 2019). 
295. Agnew v. Gov’t of the D.C., 920 F.3d 49, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Act of July 29, 1892, 













district—on weekends starting at about 3:00 a.m.296 The court regarded the 
policy as interfering with the right to travel locally that is protected under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.297 For the court, 
blocking people from passing through the sidewalk contradicted the 
sidewalk’s role and the most basic rights individuals must enjoy in that 
public space. This special nature of the sidewalk as a distinct public space 
with an innate use served the court to distinguish the litigated dispute from 
earlier cases where governments were allowed to block access to specific 
neighborhoods or regulate the uses of roads.298 
Whether or not other courts follow the Sixth Circuit’s holding, and 
irrespective of its doctrinal merits, the decision expresses an idea detectable 
throughout the legal treatment of the sidewalk ever since its modern rebirth: 
the sidewalk is a public space that has an intrinsic use. 299  Thus, in 
accordance with the test this Article offers, the public holding the rights over 
the sidewalk, and freely deciding how to employ those rights, cannot by 
default simply be the local government (otherwise, the government would 
always be authorized to close the sidewalk to pedestrian movement). To 
figure out who, if not necessarily the government, that public should be, we 
must turn to consider the three factors identified in Part II as necessary for 
the second stage of the analysis: the breadth of the contested public space’s 
natural use, the identity of the entity bearing the costs of maintaining it, and 
the degree of faith in government decision-making respecting the specific 
space. 
The first factor is the breadth, or flexibility, of the public space’s intrinsic 
use. Although the natural use of the sidewalk—pedestrian movement—is, 
as noted, clear, it is a rather broad use, one allowing for multiple variations. 
No unequivocal definition of an interference with that use can be devised, 
and thus many uses can be added to the sidewalk without undermining the 
sidewalk’s natural use.300 Consider the example of Memphis’s Beale Street. 
As noted, the Sixth Circuit held that blocking pedestrians from entering the 
sidewalk there was an interference with the sidewalk’s natural use.301 At the 
same time, Memphis has special rules for the use of Beale Street’s sidewalks 
 
296. Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2016).  
297. The court of appeals recognized that right earlier in the case of Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 
310 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2002). 
298. Cole, 839 F.3d at 537. 
299. In a recent decision, the Second Circuit found that since the sidewalk’s central function is to 
facilitate pedestrian movement, a local law regulating street vendors should be interpreted as meant to 
limit interference with pedestrian movement, and that that goal is a legitimate one. Crescenzi v. City of 
New York, 939 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 2019). 
300. See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 157 (1966) (arguing that unlike a public building, 
the public street is inevitably the locus of many activities and does not require a special regime). 
301. Cole, 839 F.3d at 537. 












which have been allowed to stand. The city barricades the sidewalk thereby 
allowing only movement by foot;302 it specifically prohibits panhandling;303 
it empowers a local association to designate spaces on that sidewalk where 
the peddling of goods is allowed;304  and it permits vendors to sell, and 
patrons to carry, alcoholic beverages on that sidewalk.305 The permission 
granted to these uses reflects the reality whereby not all, or even most, uses 
immediately and inevitably interfere with the public sidewalk’s natural 
use—pedestrian movement.306 Indeed, had the opposite been true, bicycles, 
slow walkers, runners, groups or couples, public art or furniture, and side 
vegetation as well, should have all been forbidden from entering the 
sidewalk.307  
These examples illustrate the fact that individuals clearly do not perceive 
the sidewalk as dedicated for only one single use from which no deviation 
is allowed. If the law insisted on ordaining that it must so be, it would defeat 
those expectations. It would promote a normatively undesirable regime 
defeating the diverse “valued shared ends” members of society assign to the 
sidewalk. The law would deactivate the diverse and legitimate civil rights 
claims made to the sidewalk.308 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence concurs. The 
Court has always insisted that the sidewalk is the quintessential public 
forum for exercise of free speech rights precisely because expressive 
activities there do not inherently interfere with the space’s otherwise natural 
use—pedestrian movement.309 That is not the case with respect to other 
public spaces with a natural use.310  The sidewalk and its natural use—
pedestrian movement—are thus held to be distinctly different in this regard 
from, for example, the road or highway and their natural use—vehicle 
movement.311 Almost all diverging activities interfere with the highway’s 
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natural use, as their introduction could block, or greatly obstruct, vehicle 
movement.312 That is simply untrue with respect to pedestrian movement on 
the sidewalk.313 The sidewalk can—and in American law, thankfully does—
suffer other activities that do not necessarily inhibit its intrinsic use as a 
space for walking. 
Apart from being antithetical to a ban on walking 314 —and thus 
accounting for the Sixth Circuit’s decision—the natural use of sidewalks 
does not generate a precise and unambiguous list of prohibitions on 
sidewalk uses.315 Thus, courts cannot rely on a set of common law strictures 
to monopolize all decision-making powers respecting such uses. Since the 
natural use of the sidewalk is broad and receptive of multiple interpretations, 
the democratically elected government cannot be said to flat-out lack the 
power to regulate the sidewalk.  
This conclusion that the first factor precipitates, need not imply, 
however, that the government is the only entity that should enjoy the power 
to determine what additional uses—beyond pedestrian passage—are 
acceptable on the sidewalk. The remaining two factors of the test Part II 
developed may indicate that other publics could be conceived as holding the 
public rights on the sidewalk alongside the government. Indeed, they might 
intimate that the role of those publics should even trump, in certain 
circumstances, that of the government.  
The second factor Part II suggested is the identity of the actor bearing 
the costs of maintaining the public space. This factor weighs against 
recognizing the local government as the sole “public” holding the public 
right to the sidewalk. Local governments cover little of the expense of 
maintaining sidewalks. They may mandate the laying of sidewalks, but ever 
since the inception of these mandates in the nineteenth century, abutting 
owners funded the actual construction of sidewalks.316 As the New York 
Court of Appeals put it in one early case, “It is not expected, and cannot be 
required, that the [city] shall itself forthwith employ laborers to clean all the 
walks, and so accomplish the object by a slow and expensive process, when 
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314. Swinson v. Cutter Realty Co., 156 S.E. 545 (N.C. 1931). 
315. See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Syracuse, 46 N.Y. 194, 199 (1871) (explaining that owner 
could excavate underneath the sidewalk, since the only prohibition generated by the public right to the 
sidewalk was against direct interference with the right of way). 
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the result may be effected more swifty [sic] and easily by imposing that duty 
upon the citizens.”317  
Still today, Memphis, for example, outsources all the costs of 
constructing and maintaining sidewalks to private parties. In new streets, 
the builder of the lot must construct a sidewalk where the lot fronts the street 
in accordance with the city’s specifications.318 Owners must then repair, 
maintain, and clean existing sidewalks abutting their property. 319  Other 
cities similarly provide that it is “the duty of the owner of any property 
fronting on a public street to keep the sidewalk in front thereof in good 
repair and condition.” 320  Cities routinely require the abutting owner or 
occupant to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk.321 Furthermore, many 
cities now allow area businesses to form micro-local associations—such as 
business improvement districts—to better maintain the sidewalks fronting 
their businesses and otherwise improve them.322 Such associations collect 
special taxes from area businesses to, for example, expand sidewalk 
sanitation services, fix broken sidewalks, and place public furniture or art 
on the sidewalk. 323  Private individuals do not just participate in the 
maintenance of sidewalks in these formal, legally-mandated, ways. 
Ethnographers have found that such maintenance and even policing work is 
sometimes performed by street vendors and even panhandlers occupying the 
sidewalk.324 
The government normally still carries some of the sidewalk’s 
maintenance costs due to its role as supervisor of the abutting owners or 
businesses. It might be held liable for injuries pedestrians sustain on a 
sidewalk when it failed to enforce a maintenance ordinance on those 
owners.325 The local government’s supervisory power might also subject it 
to federal and state statutory duties to render the sidewalk accessible to 
persons with disabilities.326 But since the government is responsible for only 
some of the costs of maintaining the sidewalk, there is no reason to deem 
the local government—and only the local government—the “public” in this 
public space, to the exclusion of other publics. The individual owners who 
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maintain the sidewalk abutting their homes or businesses might also be 
reasonably considered the relevant “public.” 327  Alternatively, since all 
members of the public end up participating in the maintenance of the 
sidewalk—as each maintains the sidewalk area closest to where they 
reside—perhaps the public at large is the best “public” to be designated the 
holder of public rights in the sidewalk.  
The third and final factor of the test Part II suggested for discerning the 
public in spaces with an innate use might aid in distributing the relative roles 
between these two publics—individual owners and the public at large—and 
the local government, which the first factor identified as another relevant 
public on the sidewalk. The final factor focuses on the likelihood of 
governmental disinterested decision-making respecting the public space 
that has one specific intrinsic use.  
Decisions to transact in public rights to sidewalks might raise concerns 
about the government’s motivations—though only in certain situations. 
Whenever the government transacts in public assets or rights, some 
uneasiness respecting the decision arises. 328  Risks of incompetence or 
corruption are inevitably present.329 These risks might be heightened when 
the public asset traded is the sidewalk. Sidewalks and streets might be 
valuable properties to some private actors. Such actors might enjoy 
disproportionate economic or political powers, and, therefore, the transfer 
of rights to them might appear suspicious. As scholars explain, these risks 
are alleviated in situations where government transactions are routine and 
governed by standard procedures. 330  Thus, in cases where the local 
government has specific rules for the grant of the relevant right in the 
sidewalk,331 and a schedule of fees,332 little reason exists to question the 
democratically elected government’s judgement. Such cases are those 
involving, for example, licensing the placement of publicity signs333 or café 
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tables,334 allowing temporary closures for special events,335 or issuing rights 
for an overhanging canopy.336  
Conversely, cases of one-off governmental deals, extraordinary 
transactions with an identified, and strong, market player, are generally 
conceived as meriting a closer review.337 The government should be treated 
with some distrust when it sells rights on the sidewalk that are more 
expansive than the ordinary licenses just described. The most troubling 
cases are probably those involving deals in which the government sells the 
rights to above- or below-ground utility lines.338  Similar suspicions are 
justified when portions of the sidewalk are permanently vacated for the 
benefit of some adjacent business or development. 339  Cases of this 
persuasion are much likelier to materialize in a city’s center, or in 
commercial areas, where the sidewalk is a valuable economic resource.  
In such cases the government should not be automatically assumed to be 
the public right’s custodian. Rather, a court should intervene to secure the 
public at large’s rights in the space’s natural uses. For that purpose, any such 
extraordinary deal should be scrutinized to assess the quality of the 
government’s decision-making process—so as to verify that the interests of 
the public at large were the guiding standard—and to assure that the 
consideration paid is fair.340  
Governmental misuse of public rights in sidewalks is sometimes, but not 
always, a possibility. In most mundane dealings with these spaces, the 
democratically elected government can be trusted, and thus there is no need 
to replace it in its role as the public holding the rights in these public spaces. 
However, in extraordinary deals, especially those involving sidewalks in 
commercial areas, the public at large should be the primary public 
designated the public right’s holder.  
At this concluding point, with the analysis of the two-step test for 
identifying the public in sidewalks complete, the problem of the electric 
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scooters can be revisited. Since sidewalks have a use traditionally deemed 
natural—pedestrian passage—the government should not automatically be 
deemed the “public” holding the public rights over them. Since that natural 
use is open to distinct interpretations though, the court should not employ a 
set of common law strictures to replace the democratically elected 
government in the role of the “public”—as long as the government is not 
flat out banning pedestrian passage.  
Thus, courts should not strike down governmental measures to regulate 
electric scooters: the operators’ claim that the government lacks the power 
to regulate sidewalks is untenable.341 Cities themselves should also refrain 
from making this assumption—which some of them have made—that they 
lack the power to ban the scooters.342  
Several cities appear to have realized that they do hold the relevant 
power, and have taken action to limit scooter companies. Cities alledgely 
act to protect pedestrians, and the disparate regulatory means they adopt 
highlight again the many distinct ways in which the sidewalks’ innate use—
walking—can be defined and protected. Nashville, for example, limits the 
time and areas where the scooters can be operated.343 Indianapolis charges 
the companies a fee and bans the use of scooters on the sidewalk—and their 
parking on sidewalk ramps.344 In a scooter law adopted by the legislature—
but recently vetoed by the Governor—the state of New York attempted to 
generally prohibit scooters from using the sidewalk, delegating the power 
to permit such use (and to regulate operators in general) to individual local 
governments.345 And finally, most American cities that allow scooters to 
operate within their boundaries limit the number of licenses accorded each 
operator and adjust it based on the operator’s performance and public 
complaints.346  
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Yet despite this justified propensity to regulate the scooters, cities 
sometimes still appear somewhat unsure about the actual source of their 
power to enact the regulations controlling the scooter providers’ use of the 
sidewalk. When Milwaukee attempted to regulate the scooters, it argued that 
the Wisconsin vehicle registration requirement statute covered scooters and 
thus prevented their operation on its streets (since they were not registered). 
The scooter operator sued, contending that this was a convoluted 
interpretation of the statute.347 The state legislature concurred: it amended 
the vehicle registration law to clarify that scooters are not subject to it. But 
concurrently the legislature also explicitly empowered cities to approve the 
operation of the companies and to designate spaces where scooters’ use is 
prohibited.348  
The authority of local governments, in Wisconsin and elsewhere, to act 
to regulate scooters on the sidewalks should not, as the analysis above 
showed, have been questioned. Special efforts to find some existing statute 
to which, in some creative way, local governments’ authority to act in this 
realm can be tied, are probably unnecessary. 
Still, though unquestionably desireable given this Article’s test, the local 
government’s discretion in acting on the sidewalk might justifiably be 
constricted at times—and private actors or the public at large deemed the 
“public” holding the relevant public rights there—since, as seen, the 
government does not foot most of the bill for maintaining sidewalks. 
Similarly, and as also seen earlier in this Section, when entering certain 
transactions on the sidewalk the government’s judgment might be tainted. 
Thus, if local governments reach deals with electric scooter operators, 
allowing them to freely park scooters on the sidewalk, a court should review 
those deals’ terms to safeguard the public at large’s interests, especially if 
the consideration the operators pay appears particularly inadequate or the 
process particularly fraught. So far, the deals American cities have struck 
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with scooter operators have been rather stringent in their conditions—these 
were mostly pilot programs—so concerns have not been raised; indeed, 
complaints have mostly been lodged by the unsatisfied operators, rather 
than by public members.349 An example for such a deal that appears to 
clearly favor the public can be found in Indianapolis, where the fees the city 
charges from the scooter operators are dedicated to enforcement of the 
recently enacted scooter rules—rather than to the city’s enrichment.350  
But the possibility that concerns respecting cities’ favorable treatment of 
the providers will materialize in the future should not be disregarded.351 
Such concerns might lead to a need to designate the public at large the 
relevant public for the public space. A claim recently brought against the 
city of San Diego might indicate the validity of such concerns. Plaintiffs 
argue that by not regulating the scooters on San Diego’s sidewalks the city 
neglected its duty and is thus liable for injuries pedestrians, hit by scooters, 
have endured.352 The claim might have credence given the analysis provided 
here. Since the sidewalk does have an intrinsic use, and since the 
government might at times be suspect of dubious behavior respecting the 
sidewalk’s use—especially when major corporate players, such as the 
scooter providers, are involved—its discretion to act, or not act, should be 
limited. For while many times the local government can be deemed the 
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also NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, NACTO POLICY 2018: GUIDELINES FOR THE 
REGULATION AND MANAGEMENT OF SHARED ACTIVE TRANSPORTATION (July 2018), https://nacto.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/07/NACTO-Shared-Active-Transportation-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M7QZ-PAND] (suggesting a set of best practices for cities). 
350. Briggs, supra note 342. 
351. Indeed, in a very recent complaint, plaintiffs in San Diego have accused the city of striking 
an agreement with the scooter operators that commercializes the sidewalk for private profit and ignores 
the city’s duty to keep the sidewalk accessible to people with disabilities. Complaint, Montoya v. City 
of San Diego, No. 3:19-cv-00054 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019). 
352. David Garrick, San Diego Preparing Defense Against Four Scooter Injury Lawsuits, SAN 
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appropriate “public” holding and controlling the public rights on the 
sidewalk, there are easily imaginable circumstances where that should not 
be the case. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article is being edited, the case of the Obama Presidential Center, 
which launched its discussion, continues its march through the litigation 
process. In February 2019 the federal court for the District of Northern 
Illinois issued its decision on the motion to dismiss the lawsuit against the 
Obama Presidential Center.353 In that preliminary order ostensibly dealing 
with the plaintiffs’ standing alone,354  the court adopted the complaint’s 
premise. The court established the plaintiffs’ standing to sue based on a 
public trust theory.355 It ruled that the public trust doctrine covers Jackson 
Park and hence the public interest in the park is held by the public at large, 
not the government.356 Consequently, whenever the government proposes a 
change to the park it interferes with the individual interests of each and 
every resident of Chicago. Accordingly, any local taxpayer enjoys standing 
to challenge such a governmental proposal.357  
That preliminary decision encapsulated both the descriptive and the 
normative insights of this Article. The formal doctrinal issue at hand was 
standing, yet the court in fact proceeded to ascertain who the public holding 
the public interest in the park was. The court thus explicitly acknowledged 
the descriptive fact about the law that this Article promoted: settling 
disputes over public rights is not an exercise in identifying public spaces, 
but an exercise in identifying publics.  
In undertaking this exercise, however, the court forwent a principled 
normative approach. With little doctrinal grounding, and with no policy 
analysis, it went ahead and characterized the public holding rights in the 
park as the public at large.358 It did not consider this move’s ramifications 
or logic, or courts’ ability to act upon it.  
This Article showed that this need not be the case. A consistent and 
rational approach, drawing on the history, structure, and normative 
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358. The court merely cited one case as authority: Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park District, 
160 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (N.D. Ill. 2016). That, however, was a lower court ruling in a preliminary stage of 
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than an obiter in Paepcke v. Public Building Commission, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970). No other 













rationales of the law of public spaces, can be applied to disputes over public 
spaces. If applied to the case of the Obama Presidential Center, that 
approach would have generated a result that is the opposite of the one the 
court reached in its procedural holding: one that would have viewed the 
government as the only relevant public in all cases involving parks.359 Under 
the analysis suggested here, the government’s decision could not have been 
challenged to begin with. 
Granted, an unprincipled identification of the public in a public space, 
such as the one made by the district court in its procedural decision, might 
not inevitably lead to a misguided substantive resolution of a given dispute. 
Entertaining a challenge that should never have been heard does not always 
conclude with that challenge’s acceptance. Thus, in its later summary 
judgement order on the merits, the court did approve the Presidential 
Center.360 But an unprincipled identification of the public will, inevitably, 
always open the door for an arbitrary, and pernicious, form of legal analysis. 
The district court thus only reached its substantive decision after insisting 
on establishing clear statutory intent to allow buildings in the park.361 It only 
acceded to a relatively deferential standard of judicial review under the 
public trust doctrine because the relevant park was not submerged at the 
time of Illinois statehood. 362  These findings sit on flimsy doctrinal 
foundations, and their normative justification is flimsier still. Most 
troublingly, they set a dangerous precedent for future cases where a federal 
court could mindlessly intervene in governmental decisions respecting 
parks’ management. Hopefully, the federal court of appeals, now hearing 
the case, will not endorse these findings.363 
Irrespective of the eventual fate of the Obama Center, that case 
represents only one—albeit exceptionally prominent—example. Many 
other cases about public spaces exist, and still many others will exist in the 
future. If these cases, which collectively mold the public spaces that 
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surround us all, are to be treated in a coherent and informed manner, more 
attention must be paid to the concerns this Article raised.  
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